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This joint Bruegel-PCNS publication comprised of three policy contributions from researchers of 
both institutions is the result of the establishment of the “Platform for Advanced & Emerging 
Economies Policy Dialogue”. This third publication comes to further enhance a collaboration that 
led to two previous policy reports under the theme “Towards an EU-MENA Shared Prosperity”. In 
the first paper, Uri Dadush and Yana Myachenkova explain how trade agreements that the European 
Union has with North African countries are often seen as having delivered disappointing results, 
and how the agreements have been judged too harshly, as they helped generate large amounts of 
trade. In this regard, the paper gives relevant recommendations of policies for a greater trade 
performance.
The second paper highlights the role of structural economic transformation as a necessary gateway 
for nations wishing to move up along the development path. It focuses on the case of Morocco, 
shedding light on its manufacturing sector’s transformation, its integration in Global Value Chains 
(GVC) and its economic challenges.
In “The EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy Relationship: A Fresh Perspective”, Simone 
Tagliapietra analyses how regional energy cooperation should strongly focus on fostering 
large-scale deployment of renewable energy, allowing southern Mediterranean countries to meet 
their increasing energy demand in a more sustainable way, and having positive economic and 
political benefits for Europe.
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Foreword
We are very pleased to present this joint publication, which collects 
the papers produced as part of the third collaboration between 
Bruegel and the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS). Within the 
theme “Towards EU-MENA Shared Prosperity”, our two organisations 
launched a “Platform for Advanced & Emerging Economies Policy 
Dialogue” in Rabat on 1 April 2016, and published two previous policy 
reports addressing issues of common interest in the Mediterranean 
and the MENA Region. 
The aim is to establish an ambitious, yet timely, platform for 
policy dialogue between emerging MENA economies and advanced 
economies. The cooperation between Bruegel and PCNS constitutes 
the main pillar of this platform. We aim to be the driving force for a 
content-based dialogue that can lead to concrete analytical output. 
With a strong conviction that fruitful policy dialogue should be 
primarily anchored in sound policy research, Bruegel and PCNS 
researchers have tackled issues of utmost importance to all shores of 
the Mediterranean basin through their papers.
In the first paper, Uri Dadush and Yana Myachenkova explain how 
trade agreements that the European Union has with North African 
countries are often seen as having delivered disappointing results, 
and how the agreements have been judged too harshly, as they helped 
generate large amounts of trade. In this regard, the paper gives 
relevant recommendations of policies for a greater trade performance. 
The second paper highlights the role of structural economic 
transformation as a necessary gateway for nations wishing to move 
up along the development path. It focuses on the case of Morocco, 
shedding light on its manufacturing sector’s transformation, its 
integration in Global Value Chains (GVC) and its economic challenges. 
In “The EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy Relationship: A Fresh 
Perspective”, Simone Tagliapietra analyses how regional energy 
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cooperation should strongly focus on fostering large-scale deployment 
of renewable energy, allowing southern Mediterranean countries to 
meet their increasing energy demand in a more sustainable way, and 
having positive economic and political benefits for Europe.
Guntram B. Wolff
Director of Bruegel 
Karim El Aynaoui 
Managing Director
Policy Center for the New South 
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Chapter 1
Assessing the EU-North Africa trade 
agreements
Uri Dadush, Yana Myachenkova
The authors would like to thank Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Monika 
Hencsey, Hauke Waszkewitz, Guntram Wolff and participants in a 
seminar held in Rome on 12 October 2018 for very helpful comments. 
Hamza Saoudi provided excellent research assistance.
Executive summary
• The trade agreements that the European Union has with North African 
countries – with Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia – are often seen as 
having delivered disappointing results since they came into force during 
the 2000s. The four North African countries have seen insufficient 
growth in their exports to the EU, and have undergone only limited 
diversification. In the meantime, the EU’s exports to North Africa have 
grown quite rapidly.
• Economic growth in North Africa has been well short of what is needed 
to reduce chronic under-employment, especially of young people. The 
EU trade agreements with North Africa could generate additional, large 
benefits if they either directly led to or at least incentivised behind-the-
border reforms to make the North African countries more competitive 
in international markets. Though this reform is the responsibility of 
the governments of North African countries, the EU could provide 
stronger incentives to improve the business environment. Meanwhile, 
in agriculture, were the North African countries able to compete with 
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the EU on an even playing field, agriculture’s share of domestic value-
added would almost certainly be significantly larger and rural poverty 
correspondingly lower than at present.
• Nevertheless, the agreements have been judged too harshly. They 
helped generate large amounts of trade, though not enough was done on 
the domestic front to derive the maximum benefit from them. Moreover, 
the domestic and international environment has been unfavourable, 
impeding North Africa’s progress. Over much of the relevant period, the 
EU grew sluggishly, and North African countries faced sharply increasing 
competition on European markets from China and the eastern Europe 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 and after. Generally, countries 
that acceded to the EU have done much better than the countries of 
North Africa. While the countries of North Africa are not EU candidates, 
there is much that they and the EU can learn from the example of the 
former accession countries in terms of how a new generation of trade 
agreements between the EU and North Africa could be deeper and more 
comprehensive than currently, and could be accompanied by increased 
aid for trade. 
I. The EU-North Africa trade agreements
The trade agreements between the European Union and Algeria, Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia, part of a broader effort to integrate the north and south shores of the 
Mediterranean and the Near East, have disappointed many who believed they could 
transform North Africa. 
The political context clearly has not helped. The vision of the 1995 Barcelona 
Declaration, signed by EU, North African and other Mediterranean nations was to 
create an “an area of shared prosperity,”1 but two decades on it was acknowledged 
that this vision had not been realised and the Barcelona Declaration could not 
have predicted the destabilising impact on North Africa “of al-Qaeda… and the 
subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; the political immobility and lack 
of reforms and improvements in governance in many Mediterranean Partner 
Countries…; the instability caused by the Arab Spring since 2011…; the migration 
1 The Barcelona Declaration is available at https://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/barcelona_
declaration.pdf.
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and refugee crises; or the emergence of Islamic State terrorism”2.
Over the last ten years, growth in the four North African countries3 has been 
relatively slow, volatile and characterised by large current account and fiscal 
imbalances. Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have seen per-capita income growth of 
around 3-5 percent since 2007, while in Algeria it has been a shade less than 1 
percent, some 6-7 percent slower than average of the lower middle income countries. 
These growth rates are not per se disastrous, but they are entirely inadequate to 
deal with youth unemployment in the four North African countries, which is among 
the highest in the world. Nor are they sufficient to raise the very low participation 
of women in the labour force. There has been little convergence with incomes in 
Europe, and the absolute difference in income levels might be increasing, reflecting 
the sharp slowdown in the North African countries since the Arab Spring. In this 
context, it is natural to point to the EU’s trade agreements with these countries as 
one of the culprits, or at least as not having helped.
Though we recognise the importance of the region’s political turbulence in 
influencing these outcomes, our aim is solely to provide an economic assessment 
of the trade agreements between the EU and North Africa. We argue, in line with 
previous assessments, that the trade agreements are highly imperfect and much 
can be done to deepen them and improve on them in various ways. However, we 
also argue that the common view of the trade agreements is overly negative, for 
three main reasons: 
• First, there tend to be excessively high expectations of trade agreements, 
whereas domestic conditions and policies are the main driver of economic 
growth and specifically of export performance. For the North African 
countries, domestic conditions and reforms had to play an even more 
significant role in stimulating exports since the countries faced very low EU 
tariffs even before the trade agreements were concluded. 
• Second, the welfare benefits of a trade agreement are not adequately 
measured by the improvement in the bilateral trade balance; a much 
better, though imperfect, measure is the increase in total trade between 
the parties. In the case of the EU and North Africa, total trade has increased 
significantly. 
2 As noted by the European Institute of the Mediterranean; see https://www.iemed.org/actualitat-en/
noticies/20e-aniversari-del-proces-de-barcelona/.
3 Libya, which does not have a trade agreement with the EU, is excluded.
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• Third, some international and domestic developments external to the 
agreements clearly contributed to the weak performance of North Africa’s 
exports to Europe. We cannot know the counterfactual, but it is possible 
that without the agreements, North Africa’s growth, investment and export 
performance would have been considerably worse. 
The main policy implication of this is unsurprising: more effort should be 
made to improve and deepen the existing trade agreements. More importantly, the 
North African countries need to accelerate domestic reforms. These reforms are 
needed anyway to boost economic growth and employment, irrespective of trade 
agreements, but reform can also work to maximise the benefits from the agreements. 
II. The literature takes a dim view of the EU-North 
Africa agreements
Although the trade regimes of North African countries continue to be 
ranked among the most protective, they are more liberal than in the past. Trade 
liberalisation has progressed significantly as a result of numerous bilateral and 
regional agreements, membership of the World Trade Organisation and adoption of 
its disciplines, and instances of autonomous trade reforms. For example, in Morocco 
and Tunisia, Most Favoured Nation (MFN) applied tariffs (tariffs that are applied 
to all World Trade Organisation members) on non-agricultural products were 
cut from about 21 percent in 2006 to about 8 percent in 2017. Even against this 
background, the literature reaches generally negative conclusions when assessing 
the trade performance of North African countries. Several of the studies find that 
current trade volume is well below its potential given the countries’ relative sizes, 
geographic distances from centres of demand, common language and colonial links 
(Cestepe et al, 2015). They also find that there is a low degree of intra-regional 
integration, reflecting non-complementary production structures and many non-
tariff barriers4. Associated with that fact are low integration in global value chains. 
Studies also find that there is low product and geographic diversification of the 
4 Non-tariff barriers remain major obstacles to trade within North Africa. Most tariffs in the region 
have been removed under the two major preferential agreements in the region ─ the Pan Arab Free 
Trade Area (PAFTA), which came into force in 1998 and allowed duty free access to its 17 member 
countries’ markets, and the Agadir agreement between four countries, which came into force in 2007. 
Nevertheless, red tape, poor logistics, lack of transparency and complicated customs clearance hamper 
regional trade. For example, the region’s exporters occasionally have to obtain special import permits 
to avail themselves of preferences that should be automatic under trade agreements. North Africa also 
has particularly low logistics quality, while the Middle East has onerous documentation requirements.
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region’s exports5. 
The EU plays a very prominent role in North Africa’s trade, representing by 
far the largest trading partner of countries in the region, on account of its size, 
geographic proximity, linguistic and colonial ties, and the existence of large North 
African diasporas in Europe. North African countries have long enjoyed access to 
European markets under the Generalised System of Preferences, and the formal 
effort to promote closer market integration between the EU and North Africa dates 
as far back as 1969 (Parra et al, 2016), culminating in trade agreements which 
came into force at different times (Table 1) and which were part of a broader effort 
to integrate Europe with the ‘South’.
Table 1: Trade agreements between the EU and Mediterranean countries
Country Agreement signed Official entry into force6
Tunisia July 1995 Dec 1997
Israel Nov 1995 June 2000
Morocco Feb 1996 Mar 2000
Jordan Nov 1997 May 2002
Egypt June 2001 June 2004
Algeria Apr 2002 Sep 2005
Lebanon June 2002 Apr 2006
Palestine (interim agreement) 2005 2007
Source: Bruegel.
5 Using gravity models, which predict countries’ trade flows as a function of their economic size and 
distance, Ferragina et al (2005) concluded that the volume of trade between the EU and Middle East and 
North Africa countries could be 3.5 to 4 times greater if the two regions were to reach the EU’s level of 
integration. Other stylised facts gleaned from the literature include: Mashreq countries exhibit greater 
levels of integration both within the area and with the rest of the world compared to Maghreb and Gulf 
countries; EU, Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) trading arrangements have 
not promoted greater integration among member countries (Al-Atrash and Yousef, 2000); the trade 
potential of the Middle East and North Africa region is found to exhibit the greatest degree of under-
trading, after South-East Asian countries (IMF, 2002); the region is an “underachiever”, especially 
where trade with the EU and with Eastern Europe is concerned (Miniesy, 2004); intra-regional trade 
within the Middle East and North Africa is low relative to that predicted by gravity models and worse 
than in sub-Saharan Africa.
6 Some of these agreements entered into force provisionally earlier.
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However, while North Africa’s imports from the EU have risen significantly since 
the signatures of the respective free trade agreements (FTAs), studies employing 
the gravity model find that the effect of the FTAs on North Africa’s exports to the EU 
has been modest at best (Parra et al, 2016). 
Studies attribute the unequal benefits of the bilateral trade agreements to three 
main factors:
• First, as mentioned, the fact that North African countries already faced low 
EU tariffs even prior to the agreements.
• Second, limited liberalisation of agriculture in the EU, while agriculture is 
seen as a sector that is part of North Africa’s comparative advantage. Studies 
suggest that regional trade agreements that have included agriculture tend 
to be more advantageous to developing countries, and so Middle East and 
North African countries could have benefited significantly from inclusion of 
agriculture in their trade agreements with the EU (Parra et al, 2016). This 
shortcoming has been partly corrected with new agreements on agriculture 
with some countries.
• Third, the trade agreements between the EU and North Africa are generally 
considered ‘shallow’, ie weak on liberalisation of services, investment 
and on dealing with non-tariff barriers and various ‘behind the border’ 
impediments to trade. 
Most of these studies, which compare the effect of FTAs on trade with that of 
arms-length relationships, are subject to the critique that FTAs are between parties 
that trade a lot anyway, so attempts to estimate the effects of trade agreements on 
the volumes of trade are biased downward (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). Freund 
and Portugal-Perez (2013) aimed to correct for this. They used panel data covering 
1994-2009 and controlled for country-pair, importer and exporter fixed effects. 
Their results indicated that trade agreements signed between the EU and North 
African countries during that period did not lead to better outcomes according to 
Uri Dadush & Yana Myachenkova
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various measures. They concluded that the agreements need to be deeper7. 
1. Asymmetric liberalisation
The EU undertook comprehensive trade liberalisation under General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organisation (WTO) rounds from their 
outset, while liberalisation in North Africa was slower. In fact, Algeria is still 
not a member of the WTO. Egypt joined the GATT in 1970, Morocco in 1987 and 
Tunisia in 1990. Moreover, the EU has granted preferential access to North African 
countries since 1973 under the Generalised System of Preferences or other special 
arrangements. 
For example, in 1993, Morocco’s MFN tariffs were two to ten times higher than 
the EU’s, and Morocco’s effectively-applied tariffs were the same as MFN since there 
were no bilateral trade agreements of note (Table 2). In 1993, the EU tariffs that 
Morocco faced were near zero for manufactured products and around 12 percent 
for agriculture. By 2016, both the EU and Morocco had granted each other tariff-
free access for nearly all manufactured products (Table 3). Notable exceptions 
include Moroccan imports of food and live animals, for which tariffs remain near 
12 percent. Morocco has also reduced its MFN applied tariffs dramatically, while 
the EU has made more moderate reductions. Morocco has also entered into trade 
agreements with the United States, other Arab countries and Turkey, and this is 
reflected by its effectively-applied tariffs being far lower than its MFN applied 
tariffs. For manufactured products, Morocco’s effectively-applied tariff is at time of 
writing near zero. 
7 A common challenge in the empirical gravity literature is the zero-trade problem along with the issue 
of self-selection underlined by Parra et al (2016). Helpman et al (2008) were among the first to propose 
a two-stage estimation procedure that incorporates selection into trade in the first stage and trade 
flow equation in the second stage. Hence the model is able to predict zero trade flows among others. 
However, as Cestepe et al (2015) highlighted, researchers have to find an exclusion restriction for the 
identification of the second equation, and Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011) proposed an easier to 
implement fixed effects panel Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator to solve the zero-trade problem. 
Irrespective of the various econometric challenges encountered in the assessment of the EU’s Middle 
East and North Africa trade agreements, the majority of studies agree that there is potential for greater 
intra-regional cooperation and the full inclusion of agricultural trade in EU-North Africa FTAs.
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Table 2: Moroccan and EU tariffs on goods from the rest of the world, 1993 
and 2016
1993 2016
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Food and live 
animals
36.94 7.34 36.94 10.42 23.37 2.86 18.17 7.13
Beverages and 
tobacco
31.03 15.00 31.03 39.63 30.47 1.05 9.48 5.25
Crude 
materials, 
inedible, except 
fuels
22.88 0.56 22.88 0.98 3.36 0.15 0.58 0.45
Mineral fuels, 
lubricants 
and related 
materials
24.67 0.52 24.67 0.94 5.60 0.32 1.07 0.40
Animal and 
vegetable oils, 
fats and waxes
50.70 5.90 50.70 8.53 6.53 2.04 2.47 4.64
Chemicals 
and related 
products, n.e.s.
45.92 6.25 45.92 7.52 5.64 1.75 0.79 2.90
Manufactured 
goods classified 
chiefly by 
material
62.71 3.77 62.71 6.00 12.16 1.84 2.70 3.04
Machinery 
and transport 
equipment
51.85 4.65 51.85 6.04 9.72 1.28 2.11 2.10
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Miscellaneous 
manufactured 
articles
69.59 3.71 69.59 8.56 13.26 3.45 4.63 5.85
Commodities 
and 
transactions 
not elswhere 
classif.
55.47 0.10 55.47 0.12 2.50 0.06 0.15 0.07
Source: https://wits.worldbank.org/.
Table 3: Tariffs applied by Morocco and the EU to each other, 1993 and 2016
1993 2016
EU 
effectively 
applied rate 
on Morocco
Morocco 
effectively 
applied 
rate on the 
EU
EU 
effectively 
applied rate 
on Morocco
Morocco 
effectively 
applied 
rate on the 
EU
Food and live animals 13.27 30.65 1.13 11.98
Beverages and tobacco 11.56 45.08 0 6.94
Crude materials, inedible, 
except fuels
0.77 25.2 0 0.26
Mineral fuels, lubricants and 
related materials
1.92 45.94 0 0
Animal and vegetable oils, fats 
and waxes
1.03 51.05 0 1.93
Chemicals and related 
products, n.e.s.
0.01 45.86 0 0.01
Manufactured goods classified 
chiefly by material
0.43 62.77 0 0.01
Machinery and transport 
equipment
0.03 52.28 0 0.98
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles
0.54 72 0 0.01
Commodities and transactions 
not elswhere classif.
0.25 55.97 0 0
Source: https://wits.worldbank.org/.
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As Morocco’s tariffs have been lowered from far higher levels than the EU’s 
tariffs since the 1990s, it is hardly surprising that EU exports to Morocco grew 
faster than Morocco’s exports to the EU as the agreements came into force. It is 
more perhaps surprising that exports from Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia to 
the EU also grew less rapidly than their exports to the rest of the world. From 2001-
16 EU exports to the four countries expressed in US dollars grew at 7.3 percent per 
year, while EU global exports (including to the North African countries) grew at 5.2 
percent per year. In this period, exports from the four North African countries to the 
EU grew at only 4.6 percent per year while exports from the four countries to the 
world (including the EU) grew at 6 percent per year8.
Figure 1: North African countries, average annual growth in exports to the 
EU (energy included)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
As things stand, the four North African countries except Tunisia continue to run 
large non-energy trade deficits with the EU (Figure 1). 
Tunisia’s non-energy trade with the EU was in deficit for many years but, as 
8 Sourced from the World Bank WITS database (https://wits.worldbank.org/). Algeria’s exports of oil 
and gas grew slowly and were affected by world energy market conditions, not its trade agreements. 
However, even if Algeria is excluded, the trade balance outcomes remain disappointing. 
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its domestic demand slowed amid political uncertainty, became balanced in 2016, 
despite a sharp fall in Tunisia’s production and export of phosphates. Algeria, whose 
exports are dominated by oil and gas, not surprisingly runs the largest bilateral 
deficit with the EU.
But are bilateral trade balances the appropriate measure of gains from the trade 
agreements?
Figure 2: Bilateral trade balance of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia 
with the EU, 1994-2016 (% GDP)
Total Excluding mineral fuel/lubricants
Source: Bruegel based on https://wits.worldbank.org/, Comtrade and WDI. Note: Trade is calcu-
lated on the basis of the SITC Revision 3 nomenclature.
2. Trade expansion
Well-established theories of tariffs and of the costs and benefits of trade 
agreements point to the expansion of trade between the parties, not bilateral trade 
balances, as the most important single indicator to measure the gains of trade 
liberalisation. When a small country lowers tariffs to zero unilaterally, the price of 
imports falls by the amount of the tariff, favouring consumers and firms that import 
parts and raw materials for producers. This gain, the largest immediate benefit of 
liberalisation, is measured approximately by the tariff multiplied by the volume of 
imports. The losses associated with unilateral MFN trade liberalisation consist of 
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tariff revenue, equal to the tariff multiplied by the initial value of imports, and the 
decline in domestic production of the imported products, measured approximately 
by the decline in the volume of domestic production of the imported product 
multiplied by the tariff9. Standard theory shows that because importing is cheaper 
than producing at home, the gains to consumers are greater than the losses to 
domestic producers and the loss of tariff revenue. The gains from tariff reduction 
accrue even when the tariff is reduced unilaterally, without reciprocation by trading 
partners.
The gains and losses from a bilateral trade agreement can be calculated in 
the same way as the unilateral MFN elimination of tariffs with two important 
differences. First, there is the additional gain of increased exports in the partner’s 
market (measured approximately as the increase in the volume of exports to the 
partner multiplied by the tariff applied by the partner that is eliminated as the 
agreement is implemented). Second, there is the cost of granting tariff preferences 
to the partner where the partner is not the most efficient producer of that product, 
known as trade diversion. This is measured approximately as the tariff multiplied 
by the reduction of imports from third parties. 
Thus, the net gains from a bilateral trade agreement will be unambiguously 
positive if there is little or no apparent trade diversion, and the gains are likely 
to be greater the greater the amount of trade generated between the partners. 
Figure 3 shows that North Africa’s trade with the EU grew rapidly in the wake of 
the agreements, and so did its imports from outside the EU, indicating significant 
trade creation and suggesting no trade diversion. Some North African countries, 
most notably Morocco, have reduced their MFN tariffs in recent years with a view 
to limiting trade diversion. Figure 2 also shows that, while North Africa’s imports 
from the EU grew more rapidly than its exports to the EU, the former grew far less 
rapidly than imports from outside the EU. The effect of the Arab Spring is evident in 
the sharp deceleration and then decline of trade in recent years. 
9 For a precise exposition see, for example, Krugman (2008).
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Figure 3: Trade performance of North African countries: exports, imports 
and total trade with the EU and imports from the rest of the world (exclu-
ding the EU), 1990-2017 ($ billions)
Source: WITS, Comtrade. Note: total trade is calculated in accordance with SITC Revision 3 
nomenclature. 
3. Caveats
The argument that what matters most in affecting welfare is trade creation 
rather than the trade balance – though well-grounded in economic theory – must 
come with some important caveats, which are especially relevant in the North 
African countries. The standard analysis implicitly assumes that resources (labour, 
capital, land) are fully employed and that, following trade liberalisation, factors of 
production move smoothly and quickly from the import-competing to the export 
or to the non-traded sector. However, if there are significant costs associated with 
the reallocation of resources, and especially if there are deterrents, such as acute 
political uncertainty, to investment in exporting sectors and to the upgrading of 
import-competing sectors, one can expect that the export supply response will be 
less, that the reduction in domestic import-competing sectors will be greater, and 
the costs of adjustment will be higher and that the adjustment will take longer. 
In that case, unemployment might increase and the net benefits from the trade 
agreement will be significantly reduced and could conceivably even be negative. 
Since North African economies are characterised by low employment/population 
ratios and high unemployment, especially among young people, this possibility lies 
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at the core of concerns of North African policymakers about the effects of their 
trade agreements with the EU. These concerns are fully understandable.
It is sometimes argued that widening bilateral trade deficits in North Africa 
relative to the EU simply reflect their higher return of capital as developing countries, 
and that such capital inflows are a beneficial effect of the trade agreements. There 
is evidence that, in the early years after the agreements came into effect, there was 
a surge of FDI into the region and that FDI flows into the region were higher than 
those into other lower middle income countries (Figure 3). 
Figure 4: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
Source: WDI. Note: dashed lines represent the FDI share of GDP after agreements between the 
EU and Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia respectively have been signed. 
However, as Figure 4 also shows, the flows of FDI were not sustained, with 
Morocco a partial exception. All North African countries tend to run sizable 
government deficits which contribute to current account deficits. Moreover, there 
is considerable evidence that the return of capital in North Africa is not high in 
comparison to the average of lower middle income countries. For example, 
Morocco’s investment/GDP ratio is 2.23 percent compared to 1.93 percent in the 
lower middle income group, but over the last ten years, its per-capita income grew 
at a rate about 1 percent slower than the lower middle income average. A similar 
calculation for Algeria suggests that the return of capital was even lower than in 
Morocco. A historical look at Tunisia and Egypt suggests that they used capital 
more effectively than Algeria and Morocco, but their domestic savings rates were 
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far lower and both countries exhibited high and difficult to sustain global current 
account deficits, which have led them to resort to the International Monetary Fund 
to finance their balance of payments. 
The risk that trade liberalisation might cause large adjustment costs, protracted 
unemployment and unsustainable current account deficits can provide valid 
grounds for pacing trade liberalisation, which of course also entails delaying the 
gains from increased trade. However, these obstacles do not negate the arguments 
in favour of the agreements. Instead, they show that the main issues that need to be 
addressed are the domestic causes of investor reticence, labour and product market 
rigidity, and weak competitiveness. As it happens, the EU-North Africa agreements 
did envisage immediate liberalisation by the EU but long implementation periods, 
over a decade or so, for the North African nations. However, their domestic reform 
processes have not yielded the hoped-for results.
4. Unfavourable investment climate 
An extensive literature has shown that there is no automatic (‘unconditional’) 
convergence in income level between rich and poor countries, even when trade 
between them is liberalised – underscoring the importance of domestic conditions 
and reform (Sachs et al, 1995; Rodrik, 2011). In extreme cases, where a country 
is beset by profound political upheaval and investor uncertainty, as during 
extended periods during the Arab Spring or during the protracted civil war in 
Algeria, it is unlikely that investors in the export sector will take the risk, even 
if trade liberalisation causes the currency to devalue and provides easier access 
to imported parts and raw materials. Nor, in the event of trade liberalisation, are 
investors likely to take the risk of upgrading the import-competing sector to face the 
influx of competitive products from abroad.
Various measures of progress in domestic reform, such as the World Bank’s Doing 
Business and the World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Report, suggest that the 
North African countries lag behind not just the EU but also their developing country 
peer groups, including the eastern European former EU accession countries (and 
now EU members), which have provided nearby low-cost labour in competition with 
North Africa (Figures 5 and 6). Even when political conditions have been relatively 
stable, as in Morocco, uncertainties in other parts of the region have often had a 
contagious effect.
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Figure 5: Doing Business average distance-to-frontier (DTF) scores
Source: Bruegel based on Doing Business, World Bank. Note: DTF is calculated as an average 
of DTF (starting a business), DTF (enforcing contracts) and DTF (resolving insolvency). MENA4 
stands for Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. 7STEEs stands for the seven small transition 
eastern European economies. The term was introduced by the World Bank and refers to Bulgar-
ia, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Figure 6: Global Competitiveness Index, 2007-17
Source: Bruegel based on World Economic Forum, the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 
dataset 2007-17. Note: The GCI investigates 12 aspects of competitiveness: institutions, in-
frastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education 
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and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market development, 
technological readiness, market size, business sophistication and innovation. The score ranges 
from 1 to 7 (best). LE10 includes the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
It should be noted that the North African country averages shown in Figures 5 and 
6 mask significant differences between Algeria, which is ranked among the lowest-
scoring countries in the world by both the World Bank’s Doing Business report and 
the World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Report, and Tunisia, which is ranked 
near the median. Morocco, which is the highest ranked North African country by 
both organisations (rank 69-70), is ranked higher than comparable lower middle 
income countries. Egypt is also ranked very low (115-128) relative to its income 
level.
5. A difficult international environment 
In addition to domestic impediments, four developments external to the North 
African region and to the agreements have clearly dampened the region’s export 
performance: low growth in the EU, the accession process, China’s rise and the end 
of the Multifibre Arrangement. 
First, following a period of recovery in the wake of the 1991-93 recession, EU 
growth has been on average near 2 percent since 2000, about half the average of 
the rest of the world. In addition, the EU suffered disproportionately and longer 
from the Global Financial Crisis. The subsequent euro crisis had a particularly 
pronounced effect on southern Europe, notably Italy and Spain which are, with 
France, the main trading partners for the North African countries. Even in the pre-
crisis years, exports to the EU from the Arab countries with EU trade agreements (a 
broader group than North Africa) increased slightly less rapidly than their exports 
to the rest of the world. Those countries’ total exports and total imports also grew 
less rapidly than the developing country average. Slower growth of trade with the 
EU than with the rest of the world is partly explained by the fact that EU aggregate 
imports from Arab countries grew less rapidly than EU imports from the rest of the 
world. For example, imports into the EU grew by 6.8 percent on average between 
1997 and 2007, while the imports of developing economies grew at a nearly 9 
percent annual rate.
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Figure 7: GDP growth (annual %), 1990-2017
Source: Bruegel based on WDI. Note: aggregates are based on constant 2010 US dollars. For 
Italy and Spain combined GDP growth rate weights are taken for the year of 2005. 
Second, shortly after the bilateral trade agreements between the EU and 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia were signed in 2002, 2001, 1996 and 1995 
respectively, the largest EU enlargement happened in 2004, introducing new low-
cost competition within the EU’s borders .
Figure 8 shows that the EU15’s trade balance with the 10 central and eastern 
European countries of the 2004 EU enlargement increased following their accession. 
The trade balance of these economies with the EU turned into a small deficit as 
those countries have adjusted. Meanwhile, the EU’s trade balance with the rest of 
the world fell into a large deficit, which has returned to balance in the wake of the 
financial crisis, as domestic demand slowed, especially in southern Europe. 
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Figure 8: EU15 bilateral trade balances with MENA4, the 10 countries of the 
2004 EU enlargement and the rest, 1990-2017 ($ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on https://wits.worldbank.org/, Comtrade. Note: total trade is calculated 
in accordance with SITC Revision 3 nomenclature. EU15: pre-2004 EU members. LE10 = 2004 
EU enlargement countries: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mal-
ta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Figure 9 shows that all countries that have joined the EU since 2004 have 
seen a continuing trade deficit with the EU15, with the notable exception of the 
five countries with average PPP adjusted GDP per capita higher than $23,000 
(1995-2016) (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta and Slovenia), which had 
deficits at first, followed by surpluses10. 
10 This is in line with the analysis of Papazoglou et al (2006), who attempted to quantify the potential 
gains of the 2004 enlargement. Both EU and accession consumers and producers were beneficiaries, 
but import growth relative to the export growth was higher for countries that were initially less 
integrated with the EU.
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Figure 9: EU15 bilateral trade balance with the 10 countries of the 2004 
enlargement, with Bulgaria and Romania (2007 enlargement) and Croatia 
(2013), 1995-2017 ($ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on WITS, Comtrade. Note: LE Bottom5: the five poorest 2004 enlarge-
ment countries (Estonia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland) based on average PPP adjusted 
GDP per capita (1995-2016 or 1995-2004) reported by WDI. LE Top5: the five richest 2004 en-
largement countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Malta, Hungary, Slovenia). Dashed lines represent 
post-accession trade balances.
Since the North African countries were poorer than the countries that have 
joined the EU since 2004 in the respective periods, it is perhaps not surprising 
that their trade balances followed a pattern similar to those of the poorest new 
EU members. Moreover, trade complementarity indices11 suggest that Morocco, 
for example, competes with most of the newer EU members, although less so than 
China and some of the largest East Asian economies. The index is not a perfect 
measure of complementarity because it does not take into an account the potential 
consequences of the distance between the countries and other factors that might 
11 Trade complementarity index for each individual year can be obtained using the following formula:, 
where x is the value of exports of product k from reporter country i, and X is country i’s total exports. 
Partner country j’s value of imports of product k is given by m, and its total imports value is denoted 
by M. A score of 100 points to the ideal trading partner. Computation performed at HS 2 digit level by 
WITS build in tool.
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impact trade flows.
The largest eastern European EU countries – the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary – and non-EU eastern European countries with no free trade agreement 
with the EU – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine – all outpaced their Mediterranean 
partners in export growth between 1997 and 2007. The Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary’s average export growth was 18 percent, while for Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine it was 23 percent, versus 12.7 percent for the Arab countries with EU trade 
agreements. The same divergence held for imports from the EU. Arab countries’ 
imports from the EU grew by less than 10 percent between 1997 and 2007, while 
those of the three eastern European EU countries and the three non-EU countries 
countries grew by 14.6 percent and 20.1 percent respectively. This divergence 
occurred despite the fact that the Arab countries roughly matched the eastern 
European groups in aggregate growth, which should – all other things being equal 
– have made them equally attractive to the EU as trade partners.
Third, North African countries, along with the rest of the world, have experience 
a large shift in world trade patterns and sharp declines in their export shares as 
a consequence of China’s emergence. From 1992 to 2017, China’s share of world 
trade increased from about 3 percent to about 13 percent. This has translated into 
substantial adjustment costs and has had distributional consequences, the effects 
of which are mostly visible in the industries/firms that are highly exposed to foreign 
competition. 
Fourth, a related external shock was the end of The Multifibre Arrangement 
(MFA) in 2004. The Arrangement had governed the international trade in textiles 
and clothing12 since 1974, setting quotas for each country. Quotas were fairly broad, 
covering a wide range of products, and were specified not in terms of the values but 
in terms of the physical quantities (Harrigan and Barrows, 2009). Figure 10 shows 
that as quotas were removed progressively, China’s share of textile and clothing 
exports increased almost fivefold from about 7 percent in 1990 to 33 percent in 
2017. China’s share increased massively during the final phase of quota reductions 
(Brambilla et al, 2010), but the largest increase in Chinese textile and clothing 
exports took place from 1991 to 1992. At the same time, the share of the four 
North African countries declined only slightly. Still, while North African textile and 
clothing exports were roughly equivalent to a quarter of Chinese exports in 1990, 
12 Textiles and clothing includes textile fibres, yarn/fabric/articles, and apparel/clothing/accessories, 
which correspond to 26, 65 and 84 two digit categories of the SITC Revision 3 nomenclature respectively. 
CHAPTER 1       Assessing the EU-North Africa trade agreements
TOWARDS EU-MENA SHARED PROSPERITY32
by 2017 North African textile and clothing exports were equivalent to only about 
5 percent of Chinese textile and clothing exports. Meanwhile, textiles and clothing 
shares in the total manufacturing exports of the North African countries and China 
have been declining. 
Figure 10: Selected economies, textile and clothing exports, shares of total 
textile and clothing exports 
Source: Bruegel based on https://wits.worldbank.org/ and Comtrade.
6. Slow diversification
Against the background of political uncertainty, weak competitiveness and a 
challenging international environment, the exports of North African countries 
remained overly concentrated on the EU. Within the countries’ exports to the EU, 
there was relatively little product diversification. 
North African exports include substantially fewer product types and are less 
diversified than were those of the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004. For 
example, the Herfindahl index of concentration suggests that North African export 
diversification changed little even during the pre-crisis period, from 1997 to 2007. 
Algeria has the most concentrated export structure. More than 95 percent of 
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Algerian exports to the EU were and are concentrated in petroleum and gas. Growth 
of exports of oil and gas from Algeria to the EU from 1990 to 2016 was on average 
slower than the growth of exports of oil and gas to the EU from the rest of the world. 
The period from 2008 to 2016 was marked by a negative growth rate of gas and 
petroleum imported by the EU and Algerian products were not an exception. These 
developments reflected trends in the global energy markets and were unrelated to 
the workings of the Algeria-EU trade agreement. 
Similarly, Tunisian exports to the EU are characterised by modest diversification. 
The main export categories are machinery, clothing and petroleum. But while 
Tunisia has gained a market share in the EU imports of machinery, the growth of the 
share of clothing in Tunisian exports to the EU was negative over the whole period 
from 1990 to 2016. At the same time the share of Tunisian petroleum exports to the 
EU has remained relatively unchanged, while originally growing faster than the EU 
imports of petroleum products from the rest of the world. 
Morocco’s exports to the EU are also characterised by modest diversification. 
Morocco mainly exports transport equipment and machinery, fruits and vegetables 
to the EU. Morocco improved its market share in the EU in the 1990s. From 2008 to 
2016 there were large advances in Morocco’s exports of transport equipment. The 
average growth rate of transport equipment exports was almost 40 percent while 
the growth of total EU imports of transport equipment was slightly negative. There 
also has been a large increase in the share of electrical machinery exported from 
Morocco to the EU, with the share increasing almost fourfold. 
Compared to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, Egypt’s exports to the EU appear 
to be more diversified, though the growth of market share of EU imports has 
been limited or mostly negative for some product categories. Egypt is the only 
North African country in our analysis that managed to secure a higher degree of 
diversification. At the same time, Egypt increased its market share in petroleum 
goods, historically a major export sector for Egypt. In recent years, however, the 
most significant increase occurred in Egyptian exports of electrical machinery to 
the EU, with the growth rate reaching 80 percent.
7. Weaknesses of the present trade agreements
Given the asymmetric nature of the trade liberalisation required by the 
agreements, it is surprising that the North African countries did not receive more 
as a quid pro quo for allowing the EU unrestricted access to their markets for 
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manufactured products. This could have come in four main areas: agriculture, liberal 
rules of origin, labour mobility and increased assistance and incentives to strengthen 
competitiveness in North Africa and meet technical and sanitary standards. In fact, 
while there was reciprocation in each of these areas, commitments made by the 
EU were less than what could have been expected. Since the original agreements 
were concluded, there has been further improvement in the agreements in some 
areas, especially in agriculture with Morocco and Egypt and on the rules of origin 
throughout the region. Financial assistance to Morocco and Tunisia increased after 
the Arab Spring but remains modest in relation to the size of those economies.
Ad valorem tariffs of five to 20 percent typically protect fruits and vegetables 
in the EU. An entry price system for those fruits and vegetables the EU deems 
particularly ‘sensitive’, such as oranges and lemons, provides an even higher degree 
of protection for those products. Though the North African Countries enjoy some 
preferential access in agriculture, all exporters to the EU have to contend with 
extensive subsidies provided to EU producers. While increasingly decoupled from 
production under recent reforms, there nevertheless help cover overhead costs for 
EU agriculture. According to the OECD, EU support for farmers accounted for 24 
percent of gross farm receipts and around 50 percent of value added, on average, 
annually in the late 2010s. For North Africa, access to the EU is especially important 
for goods such as fruits, vegetables and vegetable oil. The North Africa agricultural 
sector supports a significant part of GDP and an even larger share of employment. 
For example, in 2016, agriculture accounted for about 11 percent of value-added in 
Egypt and 13 percent in Morocco. In addition, it accounted for 25 percent and 37 
percent of employment respectively in these two countries13. 
In both countries, the deepest poverty occurs in rural areas, implying that 
the restrictions on agricultural trade have much more severe social implications 
than their export or GDP shares might suggest. In addition, barriers to agricultural 
exports in their most important market reduce the ability of North African countries 
to promote agricultural processing industries, which could also help tackle 
underemployment in rural areas. Were the North African countries able to compete 
13 On agriculture, processed agriculture and fisheries the EU has negotiated additions to the original 
free trade agreements with Morocco and Egypt. For these countries, the majority of their agricultural 
products enter the EU duty-free quota free, with only some products subject to special tariff treatment, 
mostly tariff rate quotas. The EU and Morocco signed an agreement on additional liberalisation of 
trade in agricultural and fisheries products, which came into force in 2012. Total trade in agricultural 
products between the EU and Morocco increased by 187 percent between 2003 and 2017, rising from 
€1.3 billion in 2003 to €3.7 billion in 2017.
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with the EU on an even playing field, agriculture’s share of domestic value-added 
would almost certainly be significantly larger and rural poverty correspondingly 
lower.
Restrictive rules of origin and limited cumulation can restrict North African 
countries’ effective market access to the EU. Until quite recently diagonal 
cumulation existed across only some countries14 and rules of origin (ROO) under the 
agreements with the EU differed across the North African countries. The ROOs for 
Egypt were not the same as those for Tunisia and Morocco, for example. Adherence 
to specific and complex ROOs placed a burden on exporters who might not be 
familiar with the specific rules and requirements. The Pan-European-Mediterranean 
(PEM) ROO system, introduced progressively since 2010, intended to remedy many 
of these problems by establishing identical ROOs and full cumulation across the 
region. However, integration of value chains across North Africa has been held back 
by individual country challenges, political instability and divisions which have 
resulted in closed borders, as between Algeria and Morocco.
UNCTAD (2004) suggested that the presence of restrictive ROOs might account 
for the failure to utilise preferences. For example, between 1996 and 2006, duties 
were paid on as much as 18 percent of Jordan’s exports to the EU that should have 
been duty-free, possibly because of the high costs of obtaining certificates of 
origin (Ayadi et al, 2009). The ROO in the PEM convention are becoming outdated, 
no longer responding to value chain or customs facilitation realities for several 
products. Negotiations are ongoing to finalise the modernisation of the PEM ROO. 
A major shortcoming of the current EU-North Africa trade agreements relates to 
the movement of workers. The EU-North Africa agreements essentially reaffirm both 
parties’ very general obligations under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, making no commitments on the number of skilled (or unskilled) workers 
allowed to work temporarily in the EU. The agreements with Morocco and Tunisia 
include commitments on non-discrimination with respect to working conditions 
and social security for their nationals legally working in the EU. Those with Algeria 
contain somewhat more liberal provisions, including limited movement of intra-
corporate transferees or key personnel within one organisation15.
14 The agreement with Maghreb countries allowed limited cumulation. Diagonal cumulation refers to 
the use of inputs from other member countries towards the value-added target.
15 ‘Key personnel’ are defined as persons working in a senior position within an organisation or “persons 
working within an organisation who possess uncommon knowledge essential to the establishment’s 
service”.
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Increased market access, the improved division of labour and increased 
competition are only some of the ways in which trade agreements can enhance 
efficiency. The agreements can generate additional, large benefits insofar as they 
either directly enact or at least incentivise behind-the-border reforms that make the 
North African countries more competitive in international markets.
To be sure, North African countries should be enacting these reforms anyway, 
regardless of trade agreements. But trade agreements can nudge them along, or 
formally include appropriate binding commitments, as they did in the case of the 
former EU accession countries (Box 1). By improving the business environment in 
North African countries and harmonising standards with EU countries, such reforms 
can engender trade, especially in increasingly complex intermediate products in 
cross-border production networks (Behar and Freund, 2011). In rough order of 
importance, such reforms could include: 
• Increased international access to and enhanced domestic competition 
in services – especially backbone services, such as transport, 
telecommunications, power generation and finance – and services that 
generate large value-added, such as wholesale and retail distribution; 
• More open and predictable foreign investment regimes; 
• Increased competition in government procurement; 
• Judicial reforms that facilitate the creation, operation and closure of 
businesses; investments in trade facilitation and the logistics chain; 
• Improved dispute settlement procedures and clearer property rights; 
• Adoption of international standards, especially in sanitation, which would 
allow the export of agricultural products; 
• Protection of intellectual property, which many believe can help encourage 
innovation and the import of advanced techniques through FDI.
• While the agreements between the EU and North African countries contain 
general expressions of intent in each of these areas, they cannot reach their 
full potential without new binding commitments or stronger incentives to 
reform.
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Box 1:
A comparison of the EU agreements with Morocco and 
with the Czech Republic
A comparison of the Czech Republic’s association agreement with 
the EU, which was signed in 1993 and paved the way for the Czech 
Republic’s EU accession treaty in 2003, to the EU-Morocco association 
agreement, concluded in 2000, reveals significant differences. The 
Czech Republic agreement went further in a number of important areas, 
from agricultural market access to rules of origin to investment. Of 
course, initial conditions in the two countries were vastly different and 
Morocco is not on an accession path, whereas the Czech Republic was. 
The comparison is nevertheless instructive because it shows what is 
possible in fashioning deep agreements.
In terms of agriculture, Morocco’s agreement initially covered only a 
subset of Morocco’s potential products and even those were restricted by 
long lists of qualifications and exemptions. Since the 2000 agreement, 
new deals have been struck which have lifted many of these restrictions 
and only a few tariff rate quotas and specific conditions now apply. 
Some of the remaining tariff quotas remain unfilled, tomatoes being an 
exception in 2017.
Similarly, though the rules of origin in both agreements allowed 
for diagonal cumulation, those in the Moroccan agreement are more 
onerous and complex and touch on more products than those in the 
Czech agreement. In addition, Czech workers were granted more access 
to the then European Community than Moroccans, including temporary 
movement (a form of services reform) and explicit spousal rights. In 
contrast, the Moroccan agreement has a clause on reducing migratory 
pressures on the EU. 
Another significant difference is in investment. Both agreements 
included the intent to improve the business environment, but only 
the Czech Republic agreement required that the rights to establish 
a business be brought into line with European Community standards. 
Furthermore, the Czech Republic commited to legal harmonisation with 
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the EU in customs, banking, competition and other laws, while Morocco 
does not. The Czech accession protocol illustrated just how much further 
regional integration can go and helps explain why the Czech Republic, 
which less than a generation ago was a planned economy, has today 
trade and investment links within the EU which go so much deeper than 
Morocco’s. 
The accession agreement provided for: incorporation into the 
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, giving Czech producers subsidies 
comparable to farmers in existing members and making agricultural 
exports to the EU free but conditioning production by a system of quotas 
or by various reference prices; allocation of structural funds amounting 
to €26.7 billion (18 percent of the Czech Republic’s 2010 GDP) over 
2007-13; adoption of the EU rule book (acquis communautaire) 
in behind-the-border reforms and more, including the adoption of 
community-wide standards; adoption of the much lower EU common 
external tariff; formally unrestricted access to service producers, though 
access remains constrained by a host of domestic regulations; freedom 
of investment and general movement of capital; and, last but not least, 
the free movement of people. 
By joining the EU, the Czech Republic also gained representation in 
the governance structure of the EU, and thus has a voice in decisions 
affecting all members. An important question, tackled in section 3, is 
whether, short of full EU membership, trade agreements with Morocco 
and the other North African countries could be broadened and deepened 
to reflect many of the features of accession agreements.
For example, the EU-Morocco association agreement on intellectual property 
rights (IPR) includes only weak provisions on enforcement; it is based on WTO’s 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
and does not reflect the higher standards set by recent investment protection 
agreements. Many of the association agreements also have very limited provisions 
relating to public procurement. The EU-Morocco agreement, for example, states only 
that the parties shall set as their objective a reciprocal and gradual liberalisation 
of public procurement contracts. Though the association agreements require that 
North African countries’ laws approximate EU standards in areas such as technical 
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rules and standards and services, no binding requirement exists. Meanwhile, 
business surveys reveal that international investors view the inadequacy of North 
African countries’ judicial systems and the weakness of their investment codes as 
a major obstacle. 
Given the highly cartelised nature of important sectors in North Africa, 
competition policy is especially important. But, as in other areas, while some of the 
EU-North Africa association agreements commit partners to introduce competition 
legislation similar to that of the EU, others contain only a very general statement 
of intent. Under the agreements with Morocco, for example, the country commits 
to ‘import’ EU legislation where it could touch upon trade with the EU (Szepesi, 
2004). 
Intended in part to remedy these weaknesses, the EU is currently negotiating 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, on 
which progress has been slow for political and technical reasons.
III. Conclusion
This brief review of the EU-North Africa trade agreements points to some fairly 
evident policy conclusions.
The single most important factor determining the region’s growth and stability 
is what the North African countries do themselves. Their domestic reforms will 
ultimately determine regional success or failure. Though changes in market access 
and trade rules are essential, the necessary domestic reforms range much wider. 
To incentivise these reforms, and to gain increased and more predictable access 
to Arab markets, foster the region’s security and therefore its own, reduce the 
likelihood of large disruptions in oil markets, and avoid periodic waves of refugees 
clamouring for help, the EU must offer concrete things. The assumption must be 
that, if reforms succeed, diversification will follow and trade structures will become 
more complementary. In turn, these will promote regional integration. 
The ideal is to aim for complete free trade between the North African countries 
and the EU, combined with low tariffs on goods from the rest of the world. One 
possible exception will relate to imports of certain agricultural products which enjoy 
large subsidies in the EU and which the North African countries will be allowed to 
protect with countervailing duties or subsidies, to be renegotiated over time as the 
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EU’s agricultural subsidy regime evolves. Even though most agricultural support in 
the EU is decoupled from production, it is nevertheless distortive to some degree 
because it encourages farming that might not occur otherwise.
This also implies that the North African countries should aim to converge 
towards the EU’s low external tariff, thus substantially lowering their average MFN 
tariffs on goods from the rest of the world. Such a process will also provide an 
incentive to other large trading partners to support the transition in various ways, 
and would also reduce trade diversion. It is possible that this process of internal 
and external liberalisation could result in a de-facto or de-jure customs union 
between the EU and the North African countries, similar to that between Turkey 
and the EU, and removing the need for origin certification, even if such a scenario 
appears far-fetched at present.
Further liberalisation of the North African countries’ foreign investment 
regimes should also be part of deeper agreements. This should be done to a degree 
comparable to that of the EU, allowing all comers to enter the services market and 
other markets, with a limited negative list. Clearly, barriers to entry into service 
sectors deter inward FDI in those sectors.
The North African countries should also commit to undertake far-reaching 
behind-the-border reforms. A possible guide to these reforms is the EU rule 
book (the acquis). The reforms required could draw on the experience of the 
accession countries that subsequently became EU members, allowing for longer 
implementation periods and with wide scope for modification to reflect the less 
advanced capacity and lower incomes in North African countries. 
In addition to unfettered access to its markets the EU should in return, establish 
a generous quota for the temporary movement of skilled workers (known as Mode 
4 provision of services in the WTO); and also establish a generous quota for several 
categories of unskilled workers (‘service providers’) based on need. 
While the EU’s size, geographic proximity and historical and economic ties to 
North Africa gives it a unique role in the region, the United States also has a security 
interest in the success of the region, as do the Gulf countries, which have a stake 
in the stability of their Arab neighbours. The EU should aim to coordinate efforts 
to accelerate the development of North African countries. Thus, the EU should 
establish, together with the US and the Gulf countries, a mixed loan and grant 
regional Fund for Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness, which would be operated 
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by the World Bank in conjunction with other international institutions and major 
trading partners. The Fund would cover technical assistance and infrastructure 
investments, and its scale and operation would take as an example the Structural 
Funds allocated by the EU to accession countries. These funds amounted to €178 
billion, about 19 percent of the aggregate 2010 GDP of the countries that joined 
the EU in 2004. The Fund would provide grants and loans and would work to 
leverage them with private sector investments, including via International Finance 
Corporation and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development vehicles.
The Fund would pay special attention to investment in backbone services critical 
to trade such as transport, telecommunications and finance, which are also critical 
to economy-wide productivity. It would seek to promote a programme of domestic 
reforms in collaboration with the African Development Bank, the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, designed to reduce behind-the-border barriers to 
trade and to increase competition in domestic markets – including by increasing the 
transparency and contestability of government procurement. These reforms would 
pay special attention to improving the working of customs and standard-setting 
bodies. The Fund’s assistance would be conditional on prudent macroeconomic 
management, the operation of democracy and respect for human rights.
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Chapter 2
Structural Transformation of the 
Moroccan Economy and Global Value 
Chains: New Insights
Abdelaaziz Ait Ali & Yassine Msadfa
I. Framework of the Study
The structural transformation of an economy remains a necessary gateway 
for any nation wishing to move up along the development path. The pace of the 
transformation of an economy depends on its ability to move from an agrarian 
subsistence society, in its initial stage, to a more productive economy. 
In the case of Morocco, the debate has gained momentum regarding the ability 
of current dynamics to accelerate the pace of economic activity to the point of 
deploying the working population in a situation of “underemployment” to sectors 
with more decent productivity levels and promising better standard of living. This 
comes against a context where the industrial sector no longer seems to be in a 
suitable position to act as a bridge between a predominantly agricultural economy 
and a predominantly tertiary one. This is to say that the Moroccan economy is 
becoming “tertiary” in a premature way, in favor of a reallocation of the agricultural 
labor force but, sometimes, at the expense of the manufacturing sector, which 
is shrinking relative to the current stage of development. Therefore, industrial 
policies have emerged, aimed principally at the development of an industrial 
fabric anchored in large multinational companies established in Morocco, which is 
supposed to forge links with smaller domestic productive structures
This work is situated at the crossroad of these perspectives: it constitutes a 
participation in the debate on the growth model in Morocco, approached from the 
perspective of structural transformation in the Kingdom and its degree of integration 
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in the GVCs, with a theoretical and quantitative basis. We use the approach 
developed by McMillan and Rodrik (2011) to propose a broad interpretation of the 
structural dynamics observed in the Moroccan economy while exploiting the OECD 
and WTO TIVA database on integration into global value chains. 
II. Theoretical Background
1. Structural transformation: A necessary condition for growth 
and economic development
Solow (1956) developed the first formulations of neoclassical growth theories. 
According to him, the accumulation of the capital factor and the improvement of 
human capital were the main triggers of growth and convergence process. However, 
these observations ignore the coexistence in the domestic economies of two 
heterogeneous economic sectors. The first is a traditional one, with low levels of 
productivity and which provides its subsistence employees. The second is a modern 
one, which embodies the characteristics presented by the neoclassical model, hence 
the emergence of dual economy models that refocuses the economy debate on the 
primordial nature of the dynamics between traditional and modern sectors for an 
understanding of growth challenges for developing countries (Rodrik (2013)). 
These models suggest that growth remains dependent on the progress made by 
each sector, but also on the ability of the modern sector to absorb more of the labor 
force released by the traditional sector. This supposes, indeed, two elements. The 
possibility, on one hand, of the traditional sector to upgrade its production systems 
and converge thereby to the modern sector and the need, on the other hand, of the 
modern sector to grow to offer employment opportunities to the labor force that 
emanates from the traditional sector. This last effect is commonly called structural 
transformation. The chart below illustrates the possibility of coexistence in a quasi-
dual economy in generally low- and middle-income countries, where productivity 
levels are relatively disparate across sectors. This heterogeneity of production 
systems in general is also a potential source of growth for these economies. In 
fact, the countries where production systems are quite heterogeneous from one 
sector to another are generally the least developed, whereas with inter-sectoral 
technological dissemination, the labor factor pulled by the most modern sectors, 
converge productivities and, ultimately, the standard of living. Hence, the role of 
the reallocation of the labor factor in the process of developing countries.
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Figure 11: Inter-sector productivity gap and level of development
The role that structural transformation can play in a nation’s economic 
building process is often the subject of consensus among different streams of 
economic thought (Kuznets, (1966) and Kruger (2008)). Retrospective studies 
of growth in both developed and emerging countries lead to universal and near-
similar conclusions, which is that any sustained growth over a prolonged period 
is associated with a metamorphosis of the economic structure of a country, which 
manifests itself through the strengthening of the role of tertiary and secondary 
activities to the detriment of primary activities. Then the secondary activities 
themselves contract in relative terms for the tertiary sector to become at a stage 
of advanced development, the main provider of jobs and creator of wealth. The 
first theoretical foundations, which have described this process, date back to 
economists Clark (1940) and Fischer (1939). Kuznets (1966), in one of his most 
important contributions, states that “rapid changes in production structure are 
inevitable – given the differential impact of technological innovations on the 
several production sectors, the differing income elasticity of domestic demand for 
various consumer goods…”. Kuznets highlighted the economic forces behind this 
structural transformation. Theoretically, this reallocation process is the result of 
a combination of two factors; the first is related to the sphere of supply (Baumol 
(1967), Ngai and Pissarides (2007)), namely the degree of technological absorption 
by sector which results in a change in relative prices, and the second is dictated by 
demand, specifically income elasticity (Kongsamut et al, 2001).
Thus, with the more intense use of the capital factor and the emergence of new 
technologies, the agricultural sector is the first to benefit from it, which makes it 
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possible to increase productivity in this sector and to free up an important labor 
supply for the industrial sector (pushing strategy). Once a level of development is 
reached, the same logic used is similar to the secondary sector and the economic 
center of gravity passes from the units producing industrial goods to the units 
producing services. Concerning the second factor, the elasticity of demand favors 
the decline of the primary sector and, subsequently, the secondary sector in favor 
of the tertiary sector (pulling strategy). With the development of the standard of 
living, the share of income allocated to food goods is shrinking. Manufacturing 
products have higher income elasticity than primary products, but with rising 
incomes, consumption is becoming increasingly service-oriented. More recently, 
Rodrick’s “Structural Change, Fundamentals and Growth: An Overview” (2013) has 
focused on the process of structural transformation as a necessary condition for the 
economic development of any nation. According to him, the emergence of new high-
productivity sectors has marked the convergence process of several economies, 
including those in Southeast Asia. Manufacturing activities are the cornerstone 
of the Asian miracle. Even in the presence of a low-skilled labor force, countries 
can rely on the industrial sector to begin their process of convergence and offer 
employment opportunities that are more attractive than the agricultural sector with 
productivity levels that are higher. The argument put forward, in this sense, is that 
the level of knowledge required in some manufacturing activities is not as high 
compared to the skills deployed in the primary sector. Thus, the reallocation of the 
labor factor between the two sectors would be fluid and the process of increasing 
the overall productivity of the economy should be triggered.
2. Can structural transformation be considered as a universal 
and standard phenomenon? 
At first glance, the reallocation of the labor factor is presumed to be fluid by 
the combination of supply and demand factors that make the process of structural 
transformation materialize through the tertiarization of the economy in question 
and the increase in productivity in each sector. In reality, structural transformation 
in the desired direction is the exception rather than the rule. Otherwise, when it 
is shared, this process is far from being standard to all developing economies and 
seems to be very specific depending on the characteristics of each economy, with 
a very different structural transformation pace. Even at the level of South-East Asia 
economies, performance remains divergent and economies, such as those of India 
and Thailand, and have not managed to replicate the same path as their predecessors, 
namely: Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia (ADB (2015)), with an agricultural sector 
that continues to employ a large part of the employed population. Some economies 
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in Latin America or Africa, starting from a similar starting point to that of the 
Southeast Asian economies, have failed to achieve structural transformation as 
much as their Asian counterparts. They continue to operate at a lower equilibrium 
point, with an African population that remains dependent on the agricultural sector 
for subsistence with very low levels of productivity. Even worse, some countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa seem to have taken the opposite path. The strong growth over 
the last decade in the African continent has overshadowed a worrying finding for 
the future of the African economic model. Under internal and external economic 
pressures, labor force in many African countries migrated from higher productivity 
activities to lower productivity activities, sometimes even to the agrarian sector. 
The number of employees in the agricultural sector has not only increased in 
relative terms, but also in absolute terms (Zambian case) (Rodrik and McMillan 
(2011)). UNECA (2015) and Vries & Timmer (2013) state that the flow of resources 
has been absorbed from the agricultural sector to the tertiary sector in the majority 
of sub-Saharan African countries, but to activities whose productivity level does 
not improve, especially informal activities. These studies confirm that structural 
transformation has significantly constrained growth in these countries. Parallel to 
the divergence of structural transformation trajectories, the manufacturing sector 
does not seem to claim the same role as a catalyst for growth and as a kind of 
bridge between the primary and tertiary sectors. While in the early stages of the 
transformation, the industrial sector was able to absorb the workforce employed in 
the agricultural sector, the recent experience of low-income countries undermines 
this standard economic fact and indicates that the labor factor is channeled in 
certain situations from the primary sector directly to the tertiary sector, at an early 
stage of development (Africa is the most illustrative example). The diagnosis of the 
African economy growth model presents this premature deindustrialization, given 
the low level of per capita income, as the main growth challenge for policymakers in 
the continent. Overcoming this impasse is likely to trigger the transition of African 
economies to a higher growth stage (AfDB (2015), UNECA (2014)). 
The sustainability of growth in Africa could not be supported solely by the 
natural resources sector, but by capitalizing on the comparative advantage of the 
continent in this area, which must take the form of a greater valuation of these 
natural endowments at the local level. The development of a manufacturing sector 
is the main challenge to ensure greater local value-added content and to attract 
the rural labor force to more productive activities. The question that arises in this 
context is related to the factors that hinder the birth of a manufacturing sector in 
Africa, at least the one with low technological content but labor intensive sector, in 
the presence of a comparative advantage in natural resources and abundant labor. 
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The business climate is often the most scathing point for researchers, who argue 
that the regulatory, logistical and policy dimensions are behind this premature 
deindustrialization of the developing countries’ economies (FERDI (2015)). It is 
widely accepted that these parameters constrain the initiation and the realization 
of investment projects, but it is also clear that the Southeast Asian countries 
were not better endowed than their African counterparts. So, the question of 
deindustrialization, although complicated to define, goes beyond the boundaries 
set by these standard factors and finds part of its explanation in other elements.
Certain economists have advanced new arguments related to this phenomenon 
and blame precisely trade openness and globalization. As explained previously, 
in developed countries the question of deindustrialization is often associated 
with technological development and its degree of absorption by each sector 
(Baumel (1967), Ngai and Pissarides, (2007)), which results in a decrease in 
relative prices in favor of manufacturing products. With less than unity elasticity 
of substitution, demand for manufactures does not increase proportionally with 
relative price declines, thus inducing a shift in economic structure that takes the 
form of deindustrialization. Rodrick (2015) points out that the logic of technological 
progress is not adequate to explain the situation of developing countries. The 
trade openness of these countries is the origin of the decline in the share of 
the manufacturing sector, whether in terms of employment or value added. The 
exchange rate policy is also suspected of having slowed down the development 
of the manufacturing sector. Faced with the opening of trade borders and fierce 
competitiveness of the world market, exchange rate policies can cushion external 
shocks to the domestic productive fabric, indirectly subsidize the manufacturing 
sector, and protect domestic firms against foreign competition by underestimates 
of domestic currencies (Balassa (1982)). Rodrik (2009) even surmises that the 
exchange rate undervaluation can mitigate market failures and promote growth. 
Rodrick and McMillan (2011) have shown, on a sub-sample of developing countries, 
that economies that have adopted an active exchange rate policy appear to have a 
successful structural transformation.
It is for these reasons that Africa does not seem to be engaged in the process of 
industrialization and its growth model risks being out of breath, in particular, with 
the fall in commodity prices. However, there is no guarantee that the role played 
by industrialization in past decades is still valid in a changing economic context. 
Structural transformation by the classical route (industrialization) is surrounded 
by many uncertainties as to its ability to replicate today. The international trend 
is towards a manufacturing sector with a higher capital intensity, and employment 
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content is low and more focused on skilled labor (Rodrick (2013)). As a result, its 
virtue in terms of its ability to absorb unskilled labor from the agricultural sector 
is likely to be in question. Microeconomic analyses of the sector in middle-income 
countries revealed the importance of efficiency and technology (approximated by 
the evolution of Total Factor Productivity (TFP)) in the growth of sector provides 
value added at the expense of the accumulation of factors of production, precisely 
human labor. Ilyas et al (2010) demonstrated, for the Pakistani case, that the largest 
contributor to the growth of the domestic manufacturing sector is TFP, based on 
aggregate data from 1965 to 2007. The Chinese case is also illustrative of this 
paradigm shift. Curtis (2016) also affirms the importance of TFP in consolidating 
growth in the local manufacturing sector. It turns out that this sector can do well 
without the contribution of the labor factor and maintain a steady pace of growth. 
Works that address these questions for the Moroccan case show an increasingly 
dominant role of the capital factor in maintaining a positive growth rate in the 
industrial sector (HCP (2016)).
This mutant environment—whose implications we have seen, which allow us 
to rethink a structural transformation—is, however, an opportunity for low-income 
economies that want to engage in the transformation process. Indeed, the production 
systems were never as fragmented as they are today. The drop in transportation 
costs, the revolution in communication technology and the decline in trade barriers 
have begun a trend towards the geographical reallocation of activities according to 
the comparative advantages of each economy. The exchange of finished goods, the 
historic engine of international trade, has given way to that of intermediate goods 
that are now the most traded in the world.
III. Structural Transformation: Lacking Role of 
Manufacturing
The contribution of the manufacturing sector to wealth creation in Morocco has 
declined over the years and has been accompanied by a decline in its share of 
employment, reaching 10.4% of total employment in 2015, down from about 12.2% 
in 1999. Therefore, the results of the labor productivity decomposition suggest 
that this sector has not contributed to productivity growth in its cross-sectoral 
component. By sub-sector, it appears that these are activities with a relatively low 
level of productivity, mainly the textile and leather industry, whose relative or even 
absolute employment has declined. This trend has intensified, especially since 
2009, with an average rate of -2.8% per year compared to a near stagnation in the 
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previous period. 
Compared to intra-sector productivity trends, despite the relatively low level, 
performance remains disappointing and below average, with improvements 
observed, especially for “other manufacturing industries” and “mechanical, 
metallurgical and electrical industries”. Productivity performance is indeed linked 
to the dynamic between value added growth and its employment content. Sectors 
with employment elasticity above unity experience a decline in apparent labor 
productivity, while sectors with a less proportional employment content show 
an improvement in productivity. For the manufacturing sector, it is clear that 
productivity growth is driven by factors other than employment, namely capital 
factor and/or total factor productivity. The elasticity of employment in relation to 
the evolution of value added is negative, meaning that value added growth destroys 
jobs. On the other hand, this measure, calculated on the manufacturing sector as a 
whole, masks significant differences between the sub-sectors. 
Table 4: Contribution of the reallocation of labor to the evolution of pro-
ductivity in the Moroccan economy 16 : (2000-2015)
Sectors Within effect
Between 
effect
Productivity 
/ total 
productivity 
(2015) in %
Elasticity of 
employment 
in %17
Agriculture 1.0 -0.2 40 -4
Fishing 0.0 0.0 165 3
Primary 1 -0.2 42 -5
Food and tobacco industries 0.0 0.1 286 87
Textile and leather industries 0.0 -0.1 39 106
Chemical and Para-Chemical 
industries
0.0 0.0 715 60
Mechanical, metallurgical and 
electrical industries
0.1 0.1 179 48
Other manufacturing industries 0.2 -0.1 172 -17
Manufacturing 0.3 0.0 152 -1
Petroleum refining and other 
energy products
-0.1 0.0 409 -1
16 Employment data with this level of disaggregation are available until 2015.
17 This measure indicates the degree of sensitivity of employment to changes in value added. Ln 
(employment) = ─*ln (value added). 
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Electricity and water 0.1 -0.1 825 12
Construction and public works 0.0 0.2 61 111
Extraction industry 0.1 0.0 335 15
Other industrial sectors 0.1 0.1 95 98
Trade, retails and wholesales 0.1 0.1 57 57
Hotels and restaurants 0.0 0.1 77 124
Transportation 0.0 0.1 100 77
Posts and telecommunications 0.1 0.2 1109 50
Financial activities and insurance 0.1 0.1 996 62
Business and personal services -0.3 0.7 539 191
General public administration and 
social security
0.4 -0.1 204 11
Education, health and social work 0.2 0.0 208 51
Other non-financial services 0.0 0.0 25 73
Tertiary 0.6 1.2 144 50
Total 2.2 1.0 - 24
Source: Authors’ calculations, data from the “Haut Commissariat au Plan”
If we decide to subdivide our study period into two sub-periods, quite interesting 
findings appear in relation to the evolution of productivity. Manufacturing activities 
recorded productivity growth of only 2%, compared to an average of 3.2% for the 
whole economy. With the exception of “other manufacturing activities”, which grew 
at an annual average rate of 6.2%, the rest of the activities saw a decline in their 
productivity, starting with chemical and para-chemical activities, which grew at 
a rate of 1.8%. Textile activities saw their productivity decline by 0.3% annually. 
Far from manufacturing activities, the highest performances were recorded by 
the agricultural sector with an annual average growth rate of 9%. Compared to 
the agricultural sector, the share of employment has fallen considerably, with 
significant productivity gains thanks to the intensity of use of the capital factor and/
or an optimization of production systems. However, the primary sector, especially 
in its agricultural component, remains the weakest link in the Moroccan economy, 
with productivity levels below the overall average of 60%. It is sufficient to note 
that it accounts now for nearly 40% of the working population, to understand the 
challenges it faces in the coming years.
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Figure 12: Average change in labour productivity 1999-2009, in%
Source: Authors’ calculations, data from the “Haut Commissariat au Plan”
In reverse, the tertiary sector displays an interesting dynamic in terms of its 
ability to generate employment and improve productivity. The telecommunications, 
financial activities, services to businesses and personal services sectors contributed 
most to the increase in the cross-sectoral component of productivity, although 
employment growth in these sectors is not as high. The effect was amplified by the 
level of productivity of these sectors, which is 6 to 16 times that of the Moroccan 
economy. In terms of productivity, one employee in the telecommunications sector 
is equivalent to 16 employees in the Moroccan economy. With the exception of 
“services to businesses and personal services”, these sectors have achieved some 
of the best performances in terms of cross-sectoral productivity trends. This shows 
that, beyond many historical facts that have shown that the process of structural 
transformation takes place through the shift from agriculture to industry and, in a 
second stage, to services (economic take-off from Asia), in some situations, notably 
in the case of Morocco (and many developing countries), the employment structure 
is altered in favor of services directly. Nevertheless, if we follow a mathematical 
logic, the economic gain in terms of wealth creation would be optimal if employees 
move to sectors with higher productivity levels, in this case the modern tertiary 
sector.
Thus, the structural transformation, understood by the term “between effect”, 
has been associated with movements in the labor factor within two blocks. The first, 
traditional, which operates at lower levels of productivity and whose standards 
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in terms of labor qualification are not high; and a second, modern, generally 
assimilated to certain activities in the tertiary sector where productivity levels 
are high and the labor force is highly skilled. The dynamics of input and output 
flows between sectors are generally recorded within each block itself. The skilled 
labor factor is generally channeled towards sectors with higher productivity, while 
the low-skilled factor is absorbed by sectors with lower productivity and whose 
alternatives are circumscribed by human capital requirements. For the national 
case, the positive contribution of the term “structural transformation” reflects, 
at first sight, a movement of the labor factor from the agricultural sector mainly 
towards the construction, trade and transport sectors, which have relatively higher 
productivity levels, without being significantly more demanding in terms of labor 
qualification. It is difficult, however, to conclude on the movements of labor factors 
within the more productive sectors.
Figure 13: Average change in labour productivity 2009-2015, in%
Source: Authors’ calculations, data from the “Haut Commissariat au Plan”
IV. Integration in Global Value Chains (GVC): First 
Insights using TIVA18 Database.
Nowadays, only the TIVA database, produced jointly by the OECD and WTO, 
makes it possible to highlight the integration of the Moroccan economy within the 
GVC, to propose a clear and content-based measure of value added in exports of 
goods and services and ultimately evaluate the impact of the recent dynamics of 
18 Trade in Value Added Database. 
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Moroccan exports on the creation of wealth and the generation of employment at 
the national level. In addition, this database offers a series of indicators that reveal 
the integration of each national business sector.
1. National exports that contain more foreign value added
One of the first signs of growing integration into GVC is the increasing weight 
of imported intermediate products in the country’s exports, or in other words, the 
share of foreign value added in the Moroccan economy’s exports. The latter has 
not stopped growing since the mid-90s, to represent in 2014 almost 25% of our 
exports. Expressed in another way, Moroccan exports in 2014 account for nearly 
75% of domestic value added, compared to 25% for foreign one. On a global scale, 
the tendency is generally towards a greater dependence of the exports of each 
country vis-à-vis the goods and intermediary service.
Figure 14: Foriegn Value Added in total exports by country in %
Source : TIVA database
Regarding each country’s level if integration in GVC occurs, the economies on 
the left of the chart display further integration. Luxembourg, for example, saw an 
increase in the weight of foreign value added in its exports to reach nearly 60% of 
total exports in 2014 compared to 40% in 1995. Likewise, countries whose foreign 
value added is relatively low, are the least integrated in the value chains according 
to this perspective. These countries are generally marked by a preponderance of 
raw material exports, which are generally intense in domestic value-added and 
require less intermediate goods for their production, especially mining products 
(Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Russia ...). These economies contribute to supplying GVC 
through commodities and positioning themselves at the upstream stage of the 
production processes.
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2. But disparities from one sector to another arise, with a 
tertiary sector that generates more value added to exports
The distribution of value added by sector hides a wide disparity from one 
sector to another. Indeed, the average of 25% for foreign value added is generally 
exceeded when it comes to manufacturing activities that are more dependent 
on intermediate products and, ultimately, foreign value added. The automotive 
industry is indeed the most dependent on foreign inputs with a share of about 
60%, followed by machinery and petroleum refining activities. It is possible that 
this proportion would be even higher if the figures were updated and reported on 
the latest developments, with Renault plant cars starting production since 2013.
Figure 15: Foreign Value added in Moroccan exports by sector, in %
Source : TIVA database
Besides the trade and tourism sector, service activities for companies, as well as 
transport, telecommunications are the least greedy for foreign value added. Better 
still, these sectors are promoting the export dynamics more generally than their 
manufacturing counterparts. Indeed, it is clear to what extent the service sectors 
make up the largest share of domestic value added exported, unlike manufacturing 
activities, especially new automotive, electronics and aeronautics activities. The 
sum of the value added generated by these four activities barely equals (Motor 
vehicles, Electrical Machinery, ICT electronics and Machinery) the value added of 
the transport and telecommunications sector contained in our exports of goods and 
services, which is considered generally, at first glance, as non-tradable. This finding 
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is slightly nuanced when it comes to the traditional manufacturing activities of the 
Moroccan economy, particularly the textile, chemical, pharmaceutical and agro-
food sectors, which capture domestic value as adding nearly 18% of total exports.
3. Services exported as “manufactured goods” 
The low value-added content of Moroccan exports of manufacturing products, 
particularly automotive, electrical and electronic, does not necessarily mean that 
these activities play their role in the growth dynamic. These sectors demonstrate 
a strong capacity to position themselves as a locomotive for growth and generate 
positive training effects on the rest of the economy. This observation is corroborated 
by the strong preponderance of the tertiary sector as a prime supplier for the 
manufacturing sector. The latter relies on the logistics activities of transport, 
telecommunications and business services in general to support the production 
process.
Figure 16 : Share of upstream services in Moroccan exports of goods
Source: TIVA database
For the Moroccan economy, the tertiary sector’s value added in exports is 
estimated at 46% of total value added in exports. This contribution is relatively 
underestimated, when the export figures are expressed in gross and not in 
value added (39%). Indeed, the world economies are no exception to this rule, 
with a tertiary sector that is a first-rate input for manufacturing exports and 
whose competitiveness can only translate into positive spillover effects on the 
manufacturing sector. The graph above confirms this observation for the Moroccan 
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economy, especially for new manufacturing activities, which includes a nearly 30% 
share of services in their exports. However, the total share of services in the value 
added exported of manufactured goods remains below the OECD average, which 
indicates a margin of possible progress in terms of competitiveness of domestic 
service industries and strengthening links between domestic suppliers and 
exporters of manufactured goods.
Figure 17: Value chains of Moroccan chemicals and pharmaceuticals
Country of
value added
Industry of
value added
Moroccan 
exports
Exports
Market
Source : TIVA database
Overall, the first figures on integration in GVC prove that the Moroccan economy 
is well engaged in this process, as shown by the evolution of the share of foreign 
value added in Moroccan exports to 25% in 2014. The increasing role of the tertiary 
sector in wealth creation and employment is reflected in exports of goods and 
services, when these are expressed in value added. This confirms that the value 
added captured by non-tradable sectors, such as telecommunications and transport, 
exceeds the value added generated by the manufacturing sectors of the automotive, 
electronics and machinery industries as a whole. Manufacturing products are now 
vectors that can guide tertiary activities for export, because nearly 30% of exports 
of manufacturing products is service products, such as logistics, service activities 
to the profit businesses and telecommunications.
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V. Challenges to Overcome for the Moroccan Economy
 
The performance of the Moroccan economy, while positive in general, poses serious 
challenges for the ability of the growth model to offer alternatives for the active 
population from the rural area who seek better job opportunities compatible with 
their skills. This extra labor supply comes in addition to the mass that reaches the 
labor market annually, nearly 180,000 per year (Ministry of Employment 2014). 
The agricultural sector is pushing away nearly 50,000 jobs annually between 
2004 and 2015. The manufacturing industries that are well suited historically to 
play this role do not prove to be able to create jobs, especially in their textile and 
clothing component. The latter, often claimed to play this role, reports a drop in 
employment and a loss of dynamism and, even worse, lower productivity levels 
than the agricultural sector for the first time in 2015. In this case , the improvement 
of productivity in the agricultural sector, which has probably exerted a “push effect” 
on the populations, has apparently not been accompanied by a growing demand 
from the textile industry “pull effect” and cannot economically attract employees 
by offering lower levels of productivity, which means lower wages. Over the study 
period, the construction sector has positioned itself as an alternative to the 
manufacturing sector as the first job creator with an annual average of 46,000 jobs 
between 2000 and 2010, since it displays the same characteristics as the textile 
and clothing industry in terms of the required sets of skills.
Nevertheless, the expansion of this non-tradable sector is still constrained by 
the evolution of domestic demand, especially after a period of euphoria in the 
sector from the second half of the 2000s. Subsequently, this sector has exhibited 
some signs of sluggishness. In addition, the productivity differentials are not as 
important; especially in regards to motivating agricultural employees constantly 
move towards this dynamic sector in urban areas and to raise, consequently, the 
level of productivity of the Moroccan economy as well as their well-being. Another 
alternative is the agro-food sector, whose employment elasticity and ability to grow 
at such a rate, to allow the absorption of the potential agricultural labor force, must 
be thoroughly evaluated. This sector, on the other hand, offers productivity levels 
that are 2 to 3 times higher than the national average and contributes significantly 
to export activities. Rodrick (2013) assumes that certain branches of the tertiary 
sector can claim such a role and help reduce the agricultural labor force, by 
offering it higher levels of productivity, like the retail trade sector, which can grow 
without calling for a highly qualified workforce. Moreover, its level of productivity 
is almost double the levels in the agricultural sector. There should be well-thought 
industrial policies aiming to meet the needs of employees, who leave or are forced 
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to leave the agricultural sector and, given their relatively low skill levels, can only 
be employed by sectors such as light manufacturing activities that do not display 
signs of dynamism.
In parallel, industrial policies, focused on the manufacturing sector, have globally 
succeeded in positioning the Moroccan economy on global value chains and turning 
it into a production hub, especially in the automotive and aerospace sectors. These 
industrial strategies are aimed at promoting local production ecosystems centered 
on world leaders to gain a growing share of export value added over time and 
ensure an implicit transfer of know-how for the benefit of small and medium-sized 
national enterprises (SMEs). This logic is based on the increasing fragmentation of 
production processes and the organization of productive systems around Global 
Values  Chains (GVCs). However, this international division of labor may be a 
double-edged practice for developing economies, such as Morocco. On the other 
hand, it provides a gateway to the international market for developing economies, 
without constraining the national economy to fully develop integrated production 
structures on their territory. On the other hand, Morocco risks being trapped in 
activities with low added-value activities and which cannot meet the economic and 
social aspirations of the labor force in the long term. We believe, however, that the 
challenge of moving up the value chains is not as critical today. It is essential for 
a lower-middle-income economy to be able to offer alternatives to the active labor 
force or those who have withdrawn from the labor market jobs that offer at least 
a higher level of productivity (salary) than the agricultural one. The productivity 
gains of the Moroccan economy, which inevitably support the improvement of the 
standard of living in the long term, come initially, to the detriment of employment 
in the short run. This consequence of the foreign competition and the opening of 
the Moroccan economy must be managed in this case by an extension of the size of 
the external markets of the Moroccan economy; to compensate for the “economies 
of the employment” induced by more efficient production systems.
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VI. Conclusion
There is, today, a consensus among economists about the important role that 
structural transformation can play in the process of nation’s development (Kuznets, 
(1966) and Kruger (2008)). Indeed, with the spread of technology across sectors, 
the labor factor is migrating to more modern sectors, allowing productivity levels in 
an economy to converge and the standard of living to grow. This is what economists 
have been observing for quite a long time globally. A change of the economic 
structure in several countries, which manifests itself through the strengthening of 
the role of tertiary and secondary activities to the detriment of primary activities 
at first, before the secondary activities contract in relative terms for the tertiary 
sector become, at an advanced stage of development, the main provider of jobs and 
creator of wealth. However, the way and the speed with which this transformation 
takes place are different from one country to another. Hence the interest of this 
work which is to try to propose a rather extensive reading of the structural dynamics 
observed in the Moroccan economy, by appealing to the approach developed by 
McMillan and Rodrik (2011). As a result, it can be observed that in the case of the 
Moroccan economy, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to wealth creation 
is decreasing and has been accompanied by a decline in its share of employment, 
which is even more marked. The results of the decomposition of labor productivity 
suggest that this sector has not contributed to productivity growth in its inter-
sectoral component. Productivity growth in the manufacturing sector is driven 
by factors other than employment, namely the capital factor and / or total factor 
productivity. The elasticity of employment in relation to changes in value added 
is therefore negative, meaning that a growth in value added in this sector not only 
does not create jobs, but also destroys them. The tertiary sector has an interesting 
dynamic in terms of its ability to generate employment and at the same time 
improve productivity. These findings pose a number of challenges for the Kingdom’s 
economy. Among these challenges is finding concrete employment responses for 
the rural labor force seeking work opportunities outside agricultural activities. 
These challenges become more complex in the presence of manufacturing activities 
that do not create enough jobs. Their lightweight component, often claimed to play 
this role, shows a decline in employment and a loss of dynamism and, even worse, 
lower productivity levels than the agricultural sector for the first time in 2015. 
The Moroccan economy is called on, more than ever, to increase its integration in 
world markets to support the productivity gains that are relatively important now 
and that do not promote absorption of the workforce. In other words, the savings 
in employment per unit produced can be offset by the increase in the size of job 
opportunities.
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Integration into global value chains may be an opportunity for the Moroccan 
economy, which is relatively well engaged in global trade, particularly in the 
automotive, aerospace and electrical sectors. In support, proactive public policies 
that promote national and international companies in their investment strategies 
are much needed. This strategy is a response to the challenges we initially faced. 
Indeed, successful integration into GVCs can accelerate structural transformation 
in a country through two main channels. First, the globalization of production 
networks has given more important role for intermediate products, which has 
given the opportunity to different countries to accelerate the movement of their 
labor force towards higher productivity sectors by specializing in one or more tasks 
within GVCs.
Second, the acceleration of the structural transformation brought about by 
integration into GVCs also lies in the possibility that developing countries will 
increase the level of their labor force through a learning effect.
The first figures on integration in global value chains prove that the Moroccan 
economy is well engaged in this process, as evidenced by the evolution of the share 
of foreign value added in Moroccan exports to 25% in 2014. The increasing role 
of the tertiary sector in wealth creation and employment is reflected in exports 
of goods and services, when these are expressed in value added. This shows that 
the value added captured by non-tradable sectors, such as telecommunications 
and transport, exceeds the value added generated by the manufacturing sectors of 
the automotive, electronics and machinery industries as a whole. Manufacturing 
products are now vectors that can guide tertiary activities for export, because nearly 
30% of exports of manufacturing products are based on service products, such as 
logistics, and service activities to the profit businesses and telecommunications.
Finally, public interventions and policies designed specifically for selective 
sectors are not enough to have a strong manufacturing sector and a competitive 
economy. A so-called “Policy mix” between “vertical” and “horizontal” policies 
should be favored. Long-term strategies related to labor market innovation and 
trade policy must be at the heart of policy makers’ concerns. Maintaining a sound 
macroeconomic framework, for example, is crucial, especially with regard to 
monetary policy decisions, exchange rate fluctuations and the direction of fiscal 
policy, which should not be neglected.
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Chapter 3
The EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy 
Relationship: A Fresh Perspective
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A new paradigm for Euro-Mediterranean energy cooperation
Source: Bruegel
The issue
Energy is a fundamental component of the economic relationship between the 
European Union and southern Mediterranean countries, largely driven, so far, by 
Europe’s quest for oil and gas supplies. However, given the booming energy demand 
in southern Mediterranean countries and their great solar and wind potential, 
regional energy cooperation should also strongly focus on fostering large-scale 
deployment of renewable energy. This would allow southern Mediterranean 
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countries to meet their increasing energy demand in a more sustainable way, and 
would also have positive economic and political benefits for Europe.
Policy Challenge
Under the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, southern Mediterranean 
countries adopted post-2020 plans to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and 
set targets for deployment of renewables. However, these commitments are largely 
conditional on international climate finance support being provided. Europe could 
scale-up its climate financing in the southern Mediterranean, but this should be 
linked to the implementation of certain energy reforms in those countries. Reforms 
should not be aimed at transposing in southern Mediterranean countries the EU 
framework and rules, but rather at removing the main barriers to the private sector’s 
engagement in those countries’ renewable energy sectors. This could be done by 
promoting pragmatic solutions to specific legal, regulatory and financial bottlenecks. 
Greater climate financing should be provided only when southern Mediterranean 
countries implement such solutions in practice. Helping southern Mediterranean 
countries meet their energy needs in a sustainable way would also benefit Europe by 
opening up new business opportunities for European energy companies, promoting 
the export of European renewable energy technologies, guaranteeing the stability 
of future gas exports from the region to Europe, promoting economic development 
in southern Mediterranean countries and delivering on those countries’ pledges 
under the Paris Agreement.
1. Energy: the core of the Euro-Mediterranean economic 
relationship
Energy is a fundamental component of the economic relationship between the 
European Union and the ‘southern neighbourhood’ Mediterranean countries19. This 
dates back to the 1960s, when discussions started on the first large-scale energy 
infrastructure in the Mediterranean region – a gas pipeline connecting Algeria to 
Italy via Tunisia. Since then, more than 6,000 kilometres of gas pipelines have 
been laid across the Mediterranean, to connect Algeria with Spain and Italy, and 
Libya with Italy. Large-scale liquified natural gas (LNG) and oil infrastructure has 
19 In the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the category ‘Southern Neighbourhood’ includes 
ten partner countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Palestinian Territories, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria.
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also been constructed all around the Mediterranean20.
This infrastructure, built on the basis of bilateral state-to-state and company-
to-company relationships between producers in the south and importers in the 
north, still channels a major part of Southern Mediterranean countries’ (SMCs) total 
exports to Europe (Figure 18).
Figure 18: SMCs’ exports to Europe: the key role of energy (€ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat data.
In the early 2000s, the idea emerged of replicating the successful gas 
cooperation story in the Mediterranean region in the area of renewable energy. 
Taking a regionalist approach rather than a traditional bilateral approach to 
cooperation, two initiatives were launched with the objective of tapping into the 
vast solar and wind energy potential of SMCs: Desertec and the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan. These would supply clean energy to the SMCs and to Europe. Desertec was a 
German industrial initiative, and the Mediterranean Solar Plan was a Union for the 
Mediterranean flagship project. Both initiatives were supported by the European 
Union, which has always viewed energy cooperation as a special tool to promote 
political stability and economic prosperity in the region.
But these two initiatives failed in less than a decade, largely because of a lack 
of commercial and political realism. The initiatives’ business models were based 
on the export to the EU of solar and wind electricity produced in SMCs and were 
not commercially viable because of: i) high electricity generation costs; ii) lack of 
electricity interconnections between SMCs and between the northern and southern 
20 For a comprehensive overview of the historical development of energy cooperation in the 
Mediterranean, see Tagliapietra (2017).
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Mediterranean shores; and iii) the lack of a clear need on the EU side for additional 
renewable energy capacity. In political terms, the initiatives did not properly 
consider that the first priority for SMCs was meeting their own booming energy 
demand. Nor did they take sufficiently into account the overall lack of cooperation 
between SMCs, the group of countries with the lowest level of intra-regional trade 
in the world. In particular, both initiatives proved unrealistic because they sought 
to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to a region that was – and continues to be – too 
complex and diverse for this to work (Tagliapietra and Zachmann, 2016).
This experience suggests that fostering renewable energy in the region cannot 
be done on the basis of a Eurocentric approach. In other words, instead of the 
traditional focus on exporting energy from SMCs to Europe, the priority should be 
supporting SMCs in meeting their booming energy demand in a sustainable way. 
Cooperation between the EU and SMCs in terms of renewable energy should be 
about developing projects for the SMCs’ consumption, not for Europe’s. Since 
2000, energy demand, especially electricity demand, has boomed in SMCs (Figure 
19). This trend is set to continue in the future, in response to expected population 
and GDP growth in SMCs.
Figure 19: Energy and electricity demand in SMCs, % change between 2000 
and 2015
Source: Bruegel based on International Energy Agency, World Energy Balances database, 
accessed in March 2018.
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From an energy cooperation perspective, the most sensible way for the EU to 
respond to this challenge is to foster the large-scale deployment of renewable 
energy – notably solar and wind – in SMCs.
The other important component of Euro-Mediterranean regional energy 
cooperation, natural gas, does not need EU support in order to progress. It is a well-
established sector in which progress is mainly driven by the private sector. As has 
been shown since 2015 in Egypt with the discovery and rapid development of the 
large-scale Zohr natural gas field, European energy companies – with the diplomatic 
backup of their respective governments – can foster vast projects without any EU 
intervention.
For renewable energy the situation is different. The sector is not yet well 
established in the region, increasing the financial and regulatory risks for European 
companies. This is the primary reason why a strong EU contribution in the field 
could foster progress.
As we will show, making progress on renewable energy in the region would not 
only allow SMCs to meet their energy demand sustainably – from both environmental 
and macroeconomic perspectives – but would also have positive benefits for the EU 
in both economic and political terms.
2. Current renewable energy developments in SMCs
The SMCs are richly endowed with solar and wind energy resources, which are 
estimated to be among the best in the world (IRENA, 2015). Solar photovoltaic (PV) 
potential is widespread in the region and can be tapped at both household and 
utility levels. Concentrated solar power performs optimally in utility-scale projects 
situated in the region’s deserts, where the intensity of solar irradiation is among the 
highest in the world. Wind power also has great potential for the SMCs, given the 
favourable wind conditions that characterise all these countries.
In recent years, the SMCs have started to exploit this potential. Between 2010 
and 2015, they expanded their installed wind capacity from 857 megawatt (MW) to 
1,942 MW, and their installed solar capacity from 74 MW to 382 MW. The greatest 
share of this increase came from Morocco, which increased over the same period 
its installed wind capacity from 253 MW to 934 MW, and its installed solar capacity 
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from 34 MW to 200 MW21.
Notwithstanding this progress, wind and solar were still a minor contributor 
to SMCs’ primary energy mixes in 2015, with shares of 0.01 percent in Algeria, 
0.17 percent in Egypt, 2 percent in Jordan, 0.3 percent in Lebanon, 1.1 percent in 
Morocco and 0.8 percent in Tunisia (Figure 20).
Figure 20: Primary energy mix in SMCs, 2015
Source: Bruegel based on International Energy Agency database, accessed in March 2018.
3. Future prospects, in light of the Paris Agreement 
In the context of the 2015 Paris Agreement on combating climate change, all 
SMCs have adopted post-2020 plans, known as Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs), to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. With the exception of Egypt, 
all SMCs have outlined clear 2030 emission reduction targets. Algeria, Lebanon, 
Morocco and Tunisia also included in their NDCs specific targets for the deployment 
of renewable energy, while Egypt and Jordan adopted similar targets through 
national energy strategies (Table 5).
These countries’ NDCs differ considerably in terms of their levels of ambition, 
but they do share a common feature: linking action to external support. The SMCs 
have committed to only modest greenhouse gas reductions through their own 
21 Data from the IRENA database.
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efforts and have promised much more substantial action only if external technical 
and financial support is made available22.
Table 5: SMC Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris 
Agreement
Unconditional emissions 
reduction targets
Conditional 
emissions reduction 
targets
Renewable energy 
implementation 
measures
Algeria 7% by 2030 compared to 
BAU
22% by 2030 
compared to BAU
27% of electricity 
production by 2030
Egypt No specific target 
determined
No specific target 
determined
Not determined
(National strategy 
20% of electricity 
production by 2022)
Jordan 1.5% by 2030 compared 
to BAU
14% by 2030 
compared to BAU
Not determined
(National strategy 10% 
of energy mix by 2020)
Lebanon 
Not ratified
15% by 2030 compared 
to BAU
30% by 2030 
compared to BAU
15-20% of electricity 
production by 2030
Morocco 17% by 2030 compared 
to BAU
42% by 2030 
compared to BAU
52% of installed 
electricity production 
capacity by 2030
Tunisia 13% by 2030 compared to 
2010
41% by 2030 
compared to 2010
30% of electricity 
production by 2030
Source: Bruegel based on International Panel on Climate Change. Note: BAU = business as usual.
International climate finance thus has a crucial role to play in fostering the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement in the SMCs and, consequently, in fostering 
the large-scale deployment of renewable energy.
4. Flows of European and international climate finance to 
SMCs
Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries committed to mobilise from 
various sources – public and private, bilateral and multilateral – $100 billion per 
22 Conditionality in relation to climate goals is not just an SMC-specific issue, but a broader issue 
for all developing countries. About 78 percent of NDCs contained within the Paris Agreement include 
conditions. Of these, over 80 percent are attached to the provision of external financial support for all 
or part of the proposed measures (Day et al, 2016).
CHAPTER 3       The EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy Relationship: A Fresh Perspective
TOWARDS EU-MENA SHARED PROSPERITY74
year by 2025 to support developing countries in their efforts to reduce emissions. 
With a contribution of €20.2 billion in 201623, the EU is the world’s largest 
contributor of climate finance to developing countries.
In recent years, SMCs have received increasing flows of European and 
international climate finance (Figure 21). Between 2013 and 2016, Germany was the 
top contributor with a cumulative investment of $2.8 billion, followed by the World 
Bank Group ($2.4 billion), France ($2 billion), the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD, $1.8 billion), Japan ($1.7 billion), the European Investment 
Bank (EIB, $1.2 billion) and other EU institutions ($0.5 billion).
Figure 21: European and international flows of climate finance to SMCs, by 
provider (2000-2016)
Source: Bruegel based on OECD DAC database, accessed in March 2018.
Over the same period, Morocco was the main recipient of these flows ($5.4 
billion), followed by Egypt ($4.6 billion), Jordan ($2.39 billion) and Tunisia ($1.5 
billion).
In terms of the energy component of these flows of finance, the EIB played a 
leading role between 2013 and 2016, with a cumulative investment of $2.1 billion. 
This was followed by Germany ($1.4 billion), Japan ($1 billion), the World Bank 
Group ($0.9 billion) and the EBRD ($0.6 billion) (Figure 22).
23 This includes contributions from the EU’s own budget, from EU member states and from the 
European Investment Bank (EIB).
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Figure 22: European and international flows of energy-related climate finan-
ce to SMCs (2000-16)
Source: Bruegel based on OECD DAC database, accessed in March 2018. Note: given the lack of 
data on EIB energy-related climate finance in the DAC database, the EIB’s contribution is here 
proxied by reporting the energy investments carried out by EIB’s Facility for Euro-Mediterrane-
an Investment Partnership (FEMIP), as per related annual reports.
Of the 2016 energy-related climate-finance flows to SMCs, 53 percent was 
devoted to renewable energy generation, 30 percent to non-renewable energy 
generation, 15 percent to energy distribution and 2 percent to energy-policy related 
activities.
In absolute terms, SMCs received $0.8 billion of European and international 
climate finance to support renewable energy projects in 2016. This figure, amounting 
to 0.8 percent of the annual climate finance commitment pledged by developed 
countries under the Paris Agreement, could be scaled-up in the future, notably on 
the basis of a stronger European commitment to the region.
More robust European action to foster the development of renewable energy 
in SMCs via climate finance should, however, be linked to the implementation 
of certain energy reforms in SMCs. These would be directed at removing the key 
barriers to the private sector’s engagement in renewable energy in these countries.
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5. Linking climate finance to better renewable energy 
governance
Scaling-up renewable energy in the SMCs in line with the countries’ NDCs will 
be costly. For instance, the World Bank Group estimates that Egypt, Jordan and 
Morocco alone would need around $100 billion in investment in renewable energy 
generation between 2016 and 2030 to meet their NDC targets (IFC, 2017).
International private investment is essential to meet this large investment need. 
However, various barriers in SMCs continue to prevent international investors from 
becoming more engaged in SMC renewable energy sectors (RES4MED, 2017). Two 
key barriers stand out:
• Legal and regulatory barriers: All SMCs have renewable energy targets, 
but achieving them ultimately relies on the presence of sound and stable 
renewable energy regulatory frameworks. On this front, much remains to 
be done in the SMCs. Jordan is the only SMC with a well-established and 
reliable renewable energy regulatory framework, while in other countries 
the situation is more complex. For instance, frequent changes in feed-in-
tariff schemes and fossil-fuel subsidies are a concern for investors in Egypt, 
while the lack of an independent regulatory authority is a key concern for 
investors in Morocco. The lack of a fully developed regulatory framework 
continues to hinder investments in Algeria, Lebanon and Tunisia.
• Financial barriers: Currency convertibility, inflation and lack of foreign 
reserves are concerns for investors in almost all SMCs. The cost of financing 
and the limited availability of debt from commercial sources for renewable 
projects represent a general challenge in all SMCs, though to different 
degrees. These barriers are felt either through non-availability of finance or 
inflexible grace periods that are not adapted to the characteristics of such 
investments.
SMCs must take action to overcome these barriers, in line with their respective 
national circumstances. That is, the governments of SMCs should act first and 
reform their energy sectors in order to unleash private investment.
Europe meanwhile could incentivise this process by offering individual countries 
more ambitious climate financing, aimed at cutting the cost of capital for renewable 
energy projects and leveraging more private investment (Box 2).
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Box 2:
The role of climate finance in reducing the cost of capital 
for renewable energy in SMCs
Over the last decade, wind and solar power have become mainstream 
technologies thanks to substantial declines in their costs. Since 2009, 
solar photovoltaic costs have dropped by 80 percent and this trend is 
continuing. Wind turbine costs have halved in the same period. In 2017, 
the cost of electricity generation from newly installed wind averaged 
$0.06 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) worldwide.
The cost structure of electricity generation from renewable energy 
technologies differs from thermal power generation since renewables 
do not use any fuels. Most of the generation cost relates to the capital 
cost of technologies. Financing costs, therefore, are key to ensuring cost-
competitiveness. Capital costs include the costs of debt and equity, and 
are affected by country- and industry-specific risks. For instance, the cost 
of capital for renewable energy investments in Europe ranges from 3.5 
percent in Germany to 12 percent in Greece for onshore wind (DiaCore, 
2016). This wide range is a consequence of the different policy risks 
that investors face (for example, differences in the national regulatory 
frameworks that support the deployment of renewable energy sources).
An enabling investment environment boosted by low financing costs 
is fundamental to create markets for renewable energy technologies. 
This is where climate finance comes into play. In SMCs, renewable 
energy is financed from various sources. One form is funding made 
available by private investors, along with land ownership. This comes 
with minor risks as funds are readily available. Commonly, local banks 
and international finance institutions (IFIs) provide loans to investors 
in renewable energy. For these loans, the interest rate, which would 
determine to a great extent the cost of capital, could depend on factors 
including loan type, the currency of the loan and funding source. For 
instance, an issue for SMCs in particular is that interest rates for local 
currency are much higher than 10 percent currently. On the other hand, 
foreign exchange loans in euros or US dollars from IFIs such as the EBRD 
and the EIB could offer investors more favourable financing costs. Greater 
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engagement of these institutions and other climate finance vehicles 
could leverage additional financing, in particular from the private sector, 
because the IFIs’ risk-mitigation and credit-enhancement tools would 
reduce the risks for private investors.
But such action should be conditional on the implementation of the reforms 
necessary to attract further private investment. To be clear, these reforms should 
not be aimed at replicating in the SMCs the European frameworks and rules. The EU 
has traditionally had a tendency to promote in its neighbourhood the take-up of EU 
energy policy principles, such as liberalisation.
This copy-and-paste approach clearly emerges from the Action Plans that form 
the backbone of the EU Neighbourhood Policy24. These plans foresee gradual 
convergence of SMCs towards European rules. In 2003, for example, a ‘Memorandum 
of Understanding for the progressive integration of electricity markets of Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia and in the EU electricity internal market’ was signed. The 
creation of Mediterranean associations of regulators and transmission system 
operators in 2007 and 2012 also somewhat followed the blueprint of EU internal 
market integration.
Recent history has shown that, apart from sharing best practices, the 
effectiveness of these initiatives has been limited. The Eurocentric approach to 
energy cooperation in the Mediterranean should therefore be changed. Instead of 
seeking to promote energy market liberalisation in SMCs, Europe should work with 
individual SMCs to formulate pragmatic solutions to specific legal, regulatory and 
financial bottlenecks.
In the legal and regulatory areas, concrete solutions to be promoted in specific 
SMCs might include measures to increase clarity and transparency of rules; to 
provide legal and administrative support to international energy companies willing 
to invest in the country; to enhance transparency and clarity of rules in dispute 
procedures and to shorten dispute resolution timeframes; to phase-out fossil fuel 
subsidies; to establish one-stop-shops for renewable energy permits. 
In terms of financing, concrete solutions to be promoted in specific SMCs might 
include measures to enhance local banks’ capacities and ranges of instruments 
24 See: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/overview_en.
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for supporting international investors; to establish a more stable central-bank 
monetary policy; to encourage transactions and power-purchase agreements with a 
more stable currency; to establish favourable tax regimes for renewables25.
Greater climate finance support should only be offered to SMCs that implement 
such solutions in practice.
6. The positive implications for Europe
Providing support so that SMCs can meet their energy demands in a sustainable 
way would benefit not only the SMCs themselves, but also Europe. Supporting 
sustainable energy development in SMCs would imply:
• Opening up new business opportunities for European energy companies to 
operate in rapidly growing markets;
• Promoting the export of European renewable energy technologies. This 
is notably the case for wind power, a sector in which SMCs rely almost 
exclusively on imported European technology (Figure 23);
• Guaranteeing the stability of future gas exports from the region to Europe, 
by allowing these countries to meet their growing electricity demand with 
renewables instead of gas. This is important for Europe because these 
gas exports are an important element of the EU’s gas security-of-supply 
architecture;
• Promoting more rapid economic development in SMCs, which is a key 
prerequisite for expanding the region’s economic and trade relations with 
Europe;
• Making a significant contribution to global emissions mitigation efforts by 
promoting the development of cleaner energy systems in SMCs, in line with 
the Paris Agreement.
25 For country-specific lists of possible pragmatic solutions, see RES4MED (2017).
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Figure 23: SMCs’ import of wind and solar technologies by source
(€ millions)
Source: Bruegel based on Comtrade
In order to have an impact, energy cooperation between the EU and SMCs should 
shift its focus from the export of energy from SMCs to Europe, to Europe supporting 
SMCs in meeting their booming energy demand in a sustainable way. Europe 
could scale-up its climate financing activity in SMCs to support these countries in 
meeting their Paris Agreement pledges. But greater support should be linked to 
the implementation of energy reforms in SMCs, aimed at removing the barriers to 
the private sector’s engagement in their renewable energy sectors. This could be 
done by promoting pragmatic solutions to specific legal, regulatory and financial 
bottlenecks in individual SMCs. Higher levels of climate finance should be offered 
only to SMCs that actually implement such solutions. Supporting SMCs in meeting 
their energy needs in a sustainable way would also benefit Europe both in economic 
and political terms.
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This joint Bruegel-PCNS publication comprised of three policy contributions from researchers of 
both institutions is the result of the establishment of the “Platform for Advanced & Emerging 
Economies Policy Dialogue”. This third publication comes to further enhance a collaboration that 
led to two previous policy reports under the theme “Towards an EU-MENA Shared Prosperity”. In 
the first paper, Uri Dadush and Yana Myachenkova explain how trade agreements that the European 
Union has with North African countries are often seen as having delivered disappointing results, 
and how the agreements have been judged too harshly, as they helped generate large amounts of 
trade. In this regard, the paper gives relevant recommendations of policies for a greater trade 
performance.
The second paper highlights the role of structural economic transformation as a necessary gateway 
for nations wishing to move up along the development path. It focuses on the case of Morocco, 
shedding light on its manufacturing sector’s transformation, its integration in Global Value Chains 
(GVC) and its economic challenges.
In “The EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy Relationship: A Fresh Perspective”, Simone 
Tagliapietra analyses how regional energy cooperation should strongly focus on fostering 
large-scale deployment of renewable energy, allowing southern Mediterranean countries to meet 
their increasing energy demand in a more sustainable way, and having positive economic and 
political benefits for Europe.
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